Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 3 Symposium on Section 1983

Article 9

April 1997

How Far Is Too Far: Analyzing the Collateral Law Applicable in
State Court Section 1983 Litigation
Scott T. Schutte

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Scott T. Schutte, How Far Is Too Far: Analyzing the Collateral Law Applicable in State Court Section 1983
Litigation, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 875 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol72/iss3/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

HOW FAR IS TOO FAR: ANALYZING THE COLLATERAL
LAW APPLICABLE IN STATE COURT SECTION
1983 LITIGATION
ScoTr T. SCHU-TE*

The recent influx of cases brought in state courts under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 is certainly ironic considering that Congressional distrust in
the ability or willingness of state courts to protect the constitutional
rights of freed slaves necessitated the original enactment of the statute.2 Nonetheless, state courts are hearing § 1983 cases on a more
frequent basis, 3 raising issues that the enactors likely did not foresee
but which judges and lawyers alike must inevitably confront.
One such issue is the collateral law4 applicable in state court
§ 1983 litigation. Sometimes referred to as a "converse-Erie" prob* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1995. The author is an associate with Jenner &
Block of Chicago, Illinois.
1. Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code ("3 1983") states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (1994).
2. In a review of the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the
precursor to § 1983, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a] major factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdiction.., was the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish those
who violated these rights." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982).
3. The number of § 1983 cases reported in state court appellate reporters increased from a
total of seven during the four years from 1969 and 1972, to 105 in 1983. See Stephen H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A ProceduralReview, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381,
435 (1984). This is just a fraction of the § 1983 cases that are heard at the state trial court level.
4. Herman defines collateral law as "state or federal rules, statutes, or practices extrinsic
to section 1983 itself, and therefore possibly not 'substantive' federal law." Susan N. Herman,
Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1062 n.23 (1989).
Neuborne employs a more specific definition:
By "collateral rules" I mean a host of issues which must be faced whenever a legal rule
is judicially enforced, including the nature and availability of defenses or immunities,
the identity of potential plaintiffs, the survivorship of the cause of action, the applicable
limitations period, rules governing the assessment and computation of damages, rules
governing the availability and scope of equitable relief, rules governing the form, timing, and sufficiency of pleadings, rules governing the burden of proof, rules governing
the availability and administration of jury trials, rules governing the allocation of functions between judge, jury and alternative methods of fact-finding, rules governing discovery, rules governing the admissibility of evidence, rules governing the geographical
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lem, 5 this issue is of particular interest because of the tension it creates
between competing state and federal interests. On one hand, the
states have an obvious interest in promulgating and following their
own collateral law schemes. 6 At the same time, there is a strong federal interest in ensuring that the remedial and deterrence policies of
§ 1983 are carried out.7 A ubiquitous federalism concern lurks in the
background: it would serve both the state and federal interests to
keep § 1983 cases involving intrastate parties in the state courts. 8
In states with collateral law that parallels federal collateral law,
there is no converse-Erie problem since the same collateral law would
be applied wherever the § 1983 claim is heard. 9 Nor does a problem
materialize when state collateral law conflicts with the substantive law
of § 1983: the Supremacy Clause 10 dictates that substantive federal
law preempts conflicting state law, whether that state law is characterized as substantive or collateral. However, a converse-Erie problem
setting of the trial, and rules governing the form and consequences of service of
process.
Burt Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
725, 767 n.173 (1981).
5. This term was first used over 40 years ago. See Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedurein
State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 Ohio ST. L.J. 384 (1956). It refers
to the seminal case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in which the Supreme
Court held that in cases arising under diversity jurisdiction, a federal court enforcing state law
must apply the substantive law of the forum state but may apply federal procedural law. In state
court § 1983 cases, the question is not whether the state court must apply federal substantive
law-the Supremacy Clause mandates that it do so-but rather whether it should apply its own
collateral law or that of the federal courts.
In using the term "converse-Erie" throughout this Note, I do not mean to imply that the
converse of the Erie approach governs state court § 1983 litigation; that is, I do not mean to
advocate that the answer is as simple as federal substantive law and state procedure. Rather, I
employ the phrase as a convenient means of referring to the procedural dilemma that arises
when § 1983 claims are heard in state court.
6. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1096-1098; infra text accompanying notes 139-40.
7. See generally Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
8. There are a number of reasons why state, federal, and federalism interests would be
served by increased litigation of § 1983 claims in state courts: (1) the general concern that federal jurisdiction over matters involving intrastate parties is an intrusion on state power would be
eased; (2) state court § 1983 litigation would relieve the federal courts of a significant portion of
their burdensome caseload; (3) combining § 1983 claims with other state claims would lead to
more efficient litigation; (4) state court § 1983 litigation would provide more harmonious resolution of civil rights abuses since an "outsider" federal judge is not making often controversial
decisions; and (5) state courts have more flexibility to deal with § 1983 cases because they are
less constrained by Article III case or controversy requirements. See Herman, supra note 4, at
1073-76; Neuborne, supra note 4, at 731-32.
9. This is not an infrequent occurrence given that, as of 1979, 23 states have adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Walter Cox & David Newbem, The New Civil Procedure:
The Court that Came in from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1979).
10. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof;.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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does arise when a state collateral law neither parallels a federal collateral rule nor directly conflicts with the substantive law of § 1983, yet is
less generous to § 1983 plaintiffs-or, conversely, more generous to
§ 1983 defendants-than the collateral law applicable had the case
been brought in federal court. In such a scenario, it is unclear whether
the state law should be applied because it is the rule of the host state
forum, or preempted in favor of the remedial and deterrence policies
of § 1983. For instance, what result if the collateral law applicable in a
state court § 1983 action requires "beyond a reasonable doubt" proof
of the state of mind requirement for the imposition of punitive damages, when a "preponderance of the evidence" standard would have
governed in federal court?'1 Surely the higher standard makes it
more difficult for § 1983 plaintiffs to recover punitive damages, but
recovery is not altogether precluded. Should the state rule be pre12
empted or applied?
The Supreme Court has provided scant guidance as to how such
§ 1983 converse-Erie questions should be answered. In Felder v.
Casey, the Court held that whether a statute is inconsistent with the
policies of § 1983 and outcome-determinative are factors that should
be considered.' 3 However, Felder left as an open question the standard that governs when preemption is required because a state collateral rule hinders the policies of § 1983, but is not outcomedeterminative. Any answer will depend on line-drawing; determining
a point where tolerable disparity between state and federal collateral
law becomes intolerable conflict with the policies of § 1983.14
11. This was the issue raised in a recent Colorado Supreme Court case, Boulder Valley
School District R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991), which is discussed infra Part IV.
12. This problem arises in a number of different settings. For instance, the Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), ruled that defendants denied summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds had the right to an interlocutory appeal in federal § 1983 litigation.
Should the same right to interlocutory appeal be given to state court § 1983 defendants, even if
as a matter of state practice interlocutory appeals are not normally allowed? The Minnesota
Supreme Court answered in the affirmative in Anderson v. City of Iopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. 1986), while North Dakota answered in the negative in Klindtworth v. Burkett, 477
N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1991).
13. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). In Felder, the Court ruled that a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute
that it found to be both inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 and outcome-determinative necessitated preemption when § 1983 litigation takes place in Wisconsin courts. See infra Part II.A.
14. I assume throughout this Note that the compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983
are carried out pursuant to the will of Congress via the collateral rules applicable in federal court
§ 1983 litigation. This seems to be a rather safe assumption, given that if Congress was unhappy
with the procedure being applied in § 1983 litigation, it could simply amend § 1983 to include
specific collateral rules it finds appropriate to carry out the policies of § 1983. Reading Congress' silence as implicit approval, the collateral law applicable in federal § 1983 litigation thus
can be seen as facilitating the fair federal forum envisioned with the enactment of § 1983.
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This Note analyzes the different approaches that could be used to
determine when, in state court § 1983 litigation, state collateral law
must be preempted because of inconsistency with the policies of
§ 1983.15 Part I consists of a brief overview of § 1983 and a discussion
of the relatively recent history of § 1983 proceedings in state courts.
Part II examines Felder v. Casey, and further defines the nature of the
§ 1983 converse-Erie problem. In Part III, different approaches to
solving the § 1983 converse-Erie problem are discussed and analyzed.
Finally, in Part IV, a recent Colorado Supreme Court case that raises
the line-drawing issue is considered in light of the various approaches.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION

A.

1983

ACTIONS IN STATE COURTS

Section 1983's History and Purposes

The history and purposes of § 1983 have been exhaustively analyzed by courts 16 and commentators' 7 alike. Essentially, § 1983
originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,18 which was enacted to give
State collateral law that is applicable in a § 1983 setting can then be measured against this
baseline of federal collateral law. Any differences between state and federal collateral law applicable in the § 1983 context indicates that the state rule is either more or less supportive of the
§ 1983 cause of action as compared to the federal collateral law norm.
However, it is illogical to conclude that all differences between state and federal collateral
law produce inconsistencies that necessitate preemption. Such a position would dictate that
state courts surrender all independence and adopt the entirety of federal collateral law when
hearing § 1983 cases. Rather, the issue addressed in this Note is how far state collateral rules can
stray from the federal collateral law norm before preemption is mandated in § 1983 state court
litigation.
For further development of this concept, see infra Part II.C.
15. Although this Note speaks in terms of "preemption"-referring to situations in which
state laws conflict with federal law and thus must be preempted under the Supremacy Clausethe same analysis can be employed in regard to the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), when
state collateral rules are needed to fill gaps in the federal collateral law scheme. In both the
converse-Erie and § 1988 contexts, absent a conflict with the substantive law of § 1983, both
analyses are reduced to looking for intolerable inconsistency between state collateral law and the
policies of § 1983. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SEerION 1983 LmGATION IN THE STATE
COURTS, § 10.5 at 10-15 to 10-16 (1988); see also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that
cities were not persons subject to § 1983 liability
17. See, e.g., Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtectionof Individual RightsWill the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3-20 (1985); Jennifer A.
Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-MandatedApproach to the Construction of
Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV. 665, 673-85 (1986); Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied ConstitutionalActions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1497-506 (1989);
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1137-75 (1977)
[hereinafter Developments-Section 1983].
18. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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life to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Although it
did not contain explicit substantive rights, § 1983 significantly exforum for all
panded federal judicial power by creating a federal
20
claims of deprivations of federally secured rights.
The Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape concluded that the Fortysecond Congress had three main purposes in enacting § 1983: (1) to
override state laws that deprived citizens of the vindication of their
civil right; 21 (2) to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate;2
and (3) to make available a federal remedy where a state remedy was
adequate in theory but not available in practice. 23 The Court has
characterized the third aim as the most important: "The very purpose
of section 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 24
At a more pragmatic level, the Court has identified the contemporary purposes of § 1983 as compensation and deterrence, 25 with the
remedial function considered paramount. 26 Moreover, the Court has
held that the § 1983 remedy "is to be accorded 'a sweep as broad as its
27
language."'
B. History of Section 1983 in State Courts
It was by no means a given that § 1983 was intended to confer
concurrent jurisdiction on federal and state courts. In fact, it is doubtful that the Forty-second Congress contemplated state court jurisdiction at all since it was the inability or unwillingness of state courts to
protect civil rights that necessitated the creation of an alternative federal forum in the first place. 8 However, the Supreme Court declared
19. "[Section 1983's] purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, 'An Act to enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes."' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
20. See Developments-Section 1983, supra note 17, at 1137-90.
21. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
22. Id. at 173-74.

23. Id. at 174-80.
24. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1880)).
25. See Carey v. Phiphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); 1 SmLDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RiGrrs AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES: THm LAW OF SECTION 1983 5 (3d ed. 1991).

26. "As we have repeatedly emphasized, 'the central objective of the Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes ... is to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory
rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief."' Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131, 139 (1988) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984)).
27. Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
28. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1982).
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unequivocally in Martinez v. California29 and Maine v. Thiboutot3°
that § 1983 jurisdiction is not limited to federal courts. 31 The tension
between competing state and federal interests regarding the collateral
law to be applied when § 1983 cases are heard in state court was an
inevitable by-product of this concurrent jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to how this
tension should be resolved. 32 It has decided only four cases directly
involving § 1983 actions in state courts, and three of these have featured a direct conflict between state law-whether it is labeled as collateral or substantive-and the Court's interpretation of the substance
of § 1983. In Martinez v. California,the Court ruled that the law of
immunities is intrinsic to § 1983, and therefore a California statute immunizing parole officers from liability for parole-release determinations was in direct conflict with the substantive law of § 1983 and must
be preempted in § 1983 cases heard in California courts. 33 In Maine
v. Thiboutot, the Court held that the attorney's fees provision 34 is part
of the substantive law of § 1983 and thus travels with § 1983 claims
into state court.3 5 In 1990, the Court concluded in Howlett v. Rose
that a state court could not use common law sovereign immunity to
refuse to hear a § 1983 claim when it could have entertained state
claims arising from the same set of facts. 36 Martinez, Thiboutot, and
Howlett are relatively easy cases since each features a direct clash between the substantive law of § 1983 and state collateral law. Consequently, the Supremacy Clause expressly mandates that the state law
be preempted; no converse-Erie problem arises because the Constitu29. 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980).
30. 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
31. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether state courts must hear § 1983 claims.
See NAHMOD, supra note 25, at 50.
32. The Supreme Court recently heard argument in another case that involves the converseErie question in the § 1983 context. In Johnson v. Finkel, the trial court denied the four individual defendants' qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action filed in Idaho. See Brief for Petitioner, Johnson v. Finkel, 1996 WL 699671, at *6-7. Defendant's filed a timely notice of appeal
to the Idaho Supreme Court on the qualified immunity issue. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte because it was not an appeal from a "final order or judgment." See
id. at *7. On a petition for rehearing, defendants argued that the Idaho courts, when hearing
§ 1983 claims, must abide by (1) the federal definition of "final judgment" with regard to denials
of qualified immunity; and, more generally, (2) the federal rule that the denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable. See id. Those arguments were rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 117 S.Ct. 356 (Oct. 21, 1996).
Petitioners raised these same arguments when the case was argued before the Supreme Court on
February 26, 1997. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1997 WL 92111 (Feb. 26, 1997.)
33. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
35. Maine, 448 U.S. at 11.
36. 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990).
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tion dictates the result. In the fourth case, Felder v. Casey, the Court
squarely confronted the converse-Erie problem, although the answer
it provided is less than conclusive.
II.

ANSWERS AND QUESTIONS IN FELDER V. CASEY

A.

The Decision

In Felder v. Casey, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against
the city of Milwaukee and certain of its police officers for an allegedly
racially motivated arrest and beating.37 The defendants moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim on grounds that the plaintiff had failed to meet

the requirements of a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that provided
that no suit could be brought against any state or local government
entity or officer unless the plaintiff provided written notice of the
claim to the defendant within 120 days of the alleged injury, waited

120 days after the notification to file suit, and then brought suit within
six months after being notified that the defendant would not settle the
claim. 38 The trial court denied the motion on grounds that the notice37. 408 N.W.2d 19 (Wis. 1987). The plaintiff, a black man, was stopped for questioning by
several white police officers who were searching for an armed suspect. See id. at 21. When the
interrogation grew loud, several of the plaintiff's friends and family members came to the scene
and convinced the officers that the plaintiff was not the man for whom they were looking. See id.
According to the police, the plaintiff continued to argue with the police officers and allegedly
pushed one of them, which led the police to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct. See id. According to the plaintiff, during the course of the arrest the officers beat him about the head and
face with batons, dragged him across the ground, and threw him into the police car in a partially
unconscious state. See id. The disorderly conduct charge against the plaintiff was later dropped.
See id. Plaintiff did not file the § 1983 claim until nine months after the incident occurred. See
id.
38. See id. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in sub.[ ] (lm),[ ] no action may be brought or maintained
against any ... governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against any officer,
official, agent or employee of the... subdivision or agency for acts done in their official
capacity or in the course of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action
unless:
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, written
notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney is served
on the ... governmental subdivision or agency and on the officer, official, agent or
employee .... Failure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the
... subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not
been prejudicial to the defendant.., subdivision or agency or to the defendant officer,
official, agent, or employee; and
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and an itemized statement of the
relief sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person who performs the duties of
a clerk or secretary for the defendant ... subdivision or agency and the claim is
disallowed.
(g) ... Failure of the appropriate body to disallow a claim within 120 days after the
presentation ... is a disallowance. Notice of disallowance shall be served on the claimant by registered or certified mail and the receipt therefor, signed by the claimant, or
the returned registered letter, shall be proof of service. No action on a claim against
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of-claim statute was inapplicable when § 1983 litigation takes place in
Wisconsin courts, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals subsequently
39
affirmed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. It held that while the
federal government could prescribe the collateral scheme under which
federal claims were litigated in federal courts, states were free to determine the procedures under which § 1983 claims are litigated in
state courts. 40 According to the court, the Wisconsin legislature was
within the scope of its power when enacting the notice-of-claim provision, and the provision is thus applicable to all claims-including
claims arising under federal law-brought against state or local governments or actors in Wisconsin courts. 41 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court supported its conclusion by noting that the notice-of-claim statute pursued legitimate state interests, including the prompt settlement
of claims and protection against stale or fraudulent claims. 42
The Supreme Court, on a 7-2 vote, reversed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and held that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute
must be preempted when § 1983 actions are heard in Wisconsin
courts.43 The Court, with Justice Brennan writing, based its decision
on two general considerations. 44 First, it reasoned that the notice-ofany defendant . . . subdivision or agency nor against any defendant officer, official,
agent or employee may be brought after 6 months from the date of service of the notice, and the notice shall contain a statement to that effect.
Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 893.80(1) (West 1997).
39. See Felder, 408 N.W.2d at 20. The decisions of the trial court and the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals were unpublished.
40. The court concluded that "[w]hile the Constitution vests in Congress 'the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts,' ... it
reserves to the state legislatures and state courts the power to prescribe the procedural scheme
under which claims may be heard in state court." Id. at 25 (citing Kramer v. Horton, 383 N.W.2d
54 (1986)).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 22-24.
43. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). Justice White, who joined Justice Brennan's
majority opinion, added a concurrence in which he argued that the Wisconsion provision must be
preempted because it provided for an inappropriately short statute of limitations for a § 1983
claim. See id. at 153-56 (White, J.,
concurring). In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the
Court had ruled that as a matter of substantive law § 1983 suits were governed by the state
statute of limitations applicable to personal injury suits. White reasoned that the notice-of-claim
statute clashed with Wilson v. Garcia because it was significantly shorter than the otherwise
applicable Wisconsin statute of limitations, and thus should be preempted. See Felder, 487 U.S.
at 155-56 (White, J., concurring).
44. In analyzing Felder v. Casey, Herman found nine rationales, both explicit and implicit,
imbedded in the Court's opinion. These included: (1) "the statute conflicts in purpose and effect
with the remedial objectives of § 1983"; (2) application of the notice-of-claim statute will produce different outcomes based on whether the claim was brought in state or federal court; (3)
"the notice-of-claim statute discriminates against federal claims"; (4) the statute is outcomedeterminative, and states cannot apply outcome-determinative law when entertaining a federal
right to recovery; (5) the statute conditions a federal right to recovery; (6) the statute is not a
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claim statute was inconsistent with the remedial purpose of § 1983 because it conditioned a federally created right of recovery, 45 discriminated against a federal right of recovery, 46 and effectively served as an
exhaustion requirement.4 7 Second, the Court held that the federal interest in interstate uniformity necessitated the preemption of state collateral laws that would "frequently and predictably produce different
outcomes.., based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or
federal court." 48 In reaching this second conclusion, the Court-relying on Federal Employer Liability Act and diversity cases-explicitly
rejected the notion that equitable federalism considerations dictate
that § 1983 state court plaintiffs abide by the rules of the state court in
which they seek redress, even if those rules are outcome49
determinative.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
and in doing so embraced the equitable federalism argument that
plaintiffs who choose to bring their § 1983 cases in state court must
abide by the rules set forth by that court.50 Justice O'Connor argued
that the inconsistencies between the Wisconsin provision and the purposes and policies of § 1983 existed only in the majority's incorrect
and overly expansive interpretation of § 1983, its legislative history,
neutral and uniformly applicable rule; (7) the statute is in effect an exhaustion requirement; (8)
the states may not impose unnecessary burdens on rights to recovery; and (9) the states should
show the same deference to the federal courts under § 1983 as the federal courts would show the
states in a diversity action. Herman, supra note 4, at 1066-67.
45. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 142-145. The Court emphasized that both in purpose and in
effect the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute directly benefitted governmental defendants in
§ 1983 actions, and as such burdened a federal right to recovery. See id. at 142. The statute,
according to the Court, mirrored in both purpose and effect the governmental immunity statutes
it had previously ruled inapplicable in state court § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). The Court also specifically pointed out that it did not see this burdening of a federal right as a "natural or permissible consequence of an otherwise neutral, uniformly
applicable state rule" because the Wisconsin statute only applies to a specific class of plaintiffs,
those who sue governmental defendants. Felder, 487 U.S. at 144.
46. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 145-46. The Court reasoned that since plaintiffs who sued governmental defendants were subject to the notice-of-claim statute while all other plaintiffs were
not, the statute discriminated against the federal right of recovery created by § 1983. See id. at
146.
47. See id. at 146-50. The Court viewed the notice-of-claim statute as an exhaustion requirement in that it required that the plaintiff meet certain administrative obligations before a
suit against a governmental defendant could be filed. See id. at 146. Relying on Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), in which the Court had ruled that plaintiffs did not have to
exhaust state administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 suit in federal court, the Court concluded that "[gliven the evil at which the federal civil rights legislation was aimed, there is simply
no reason to suppose that Congress ...contemplated that those who sought to vindicate their
federal rights in state courts could be required to seek redress in the first instance from the very
state officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated their injuries." Felder, 487 U.S. at 147.
48. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 138; see also id. at 150-53.
49. See id at 150-53.
50. See id at 156-63 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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and § 1983 case law. 51 She concluded that the notice-of-claim statute
should have been applied because Wisconsin had legitimate reasons
for enacting it, while the majority's argument lacked valid grounds for
preemption.52
B.

The Precedential Value of Felder v. Casey

While Felder is a clear statement that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim
statute must be preempted when § 1983 claims are brought in Wisconsin courts, it is unclear what effect the decision should have on § 1983
state court litigation generally. At the very least, Felder requires that
in addition to being consistent with the substantive law of § 1983, collateral rules governing state court § 1983 proceedings cannot be both
inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 and outcome-determinative.
However, Felder leaves unanswered some crucial questions about
where the preemption threshold lies, and how-if at all-inconsistency and outcome-determination relate to each other.
Felder suggests that a state collateral law that is either inconsistent
with the policies of § 1983 or outcome-determinative should be
preempted:
"[E]nforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions
brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it
must yield to the federal interest. This interference, however, is not
the only consequence of the statute that renders its application in

§ 1983 cases invalid. In a State that demands compliance with such
a statute before a § 1983 action may be brought or maintained in its
courts, the outcome of federal civil rights litigation will frequently
and predictably depend on whether it is brought in state or federal
court. ... [F]ederalism... dictate[s] that the State's outcome-deter-

minative law
must give way when a party asserts a federal right in
state court.53
Although Felder intimates that either of the conditions might suffice
as grounds for preemption, a closer analysis calls into doubt whether
this is actually true.
51. See id. Herman echoes Justice O'Connor's sentiments about the Court's reading of
Congressional intent: "Congress has been so silent on most of the key questions concerning the
state courts' role in section 1983 litigation that the Supreme Court's divining of congressional
intent in this area verges on the psychic." Herman, supra note 4, at 1091.
52. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 157-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 151 (emphasis added) (Brennan, J.). I hesitate to declare that Felder unequivocally holds that inconsistency alone triggers preemption because of the inclusion of the word
"so." That qualifier insinuates a degree inconsistency and as such could mean that a state collateral rule that does not interfere with the policies of § 1983 as much as Wisconsin' notice-of-claim
statute-that is, a statute that is not as inconsistent as the Wisconsin statute-might not require
preemption. See infra text accompanying notes 156-184.
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If inconsistency and outcome-determination are treated as independent grounds for preempting a state collateral rule, 54 the two
grounds can be combined to create four categories into which any
state collateral law can be placed: inconsistent and outcome-determinative; inconsistent but not outcome-determinative; consistent and
outcome-determinative; and consistent but not outcome-determinative. According to the implication of the Felder Court's decision that
inconsistency or outcome-determination independently could mandate preemption, only the state collateral rules in the consistent/not
outcome-determinative category could survive converse-Erie analysis.
This seems like an improper result, however, for state collateral rules
that are so generous to § 1983 plaintiffs that they are, in effect, outcome-determinative.5 5 Such rules are indeed consistent with the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983, but they are also outcomedeterminative because they frequently and predictably would allow a
§ 1983 plaintiff who would have lost in federal court to win in state
court. 56 Aside from a monomaniacal interest in uniformity of result,
there is no plausible reason to preempt outcome-determinative state
collateral laws that are nonetheless consistent with the policies of
§ 1983. 57
Perhaps, then, it is necessary to reevaluate the relationship of the
two grounds the Court gives for preempting the Wisconsin notice-ofclaim provision. Whatever effect they have independently, the Felder
Court did not hesitate to strike down the Wisconsin statute that was
both inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 and outcome-determinative.58 Other state collateral rules that are both inconsistent and outcome-determinative would likely meet the same fate. Rules in the
consistent/not outcome-determinative category obviously should be
54. By independent, I mean that each of the factors involves a separate inquiry: (1) Is the
state law inconsistent with the policies of § 1983, and; (2) Is the state law outcomedeterminative?

55. One hypothetical example is a state collateral law that grants standing to a plaintiff who
lacks Article III standing in the federal courts. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1120-23.

56. For instance, returning to the hypothetical state rule proposed supra note 55, the compensatory purpose of § 1983 would be served by allowing a plaintiff the opportunity to be compensated for an alleged civil rights violation, but the state collateral law would nonetheless be
outcome-determinative because the plaintiff would always lose-by being deprived by Article
III considerations of having any opportunity of winning-in federal court.

57. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1115-18, 1130-31. However, this argument cannot be made
when a state collateral law is more generous than the substantive law of § 1983 (as opposed to
the policies of § 1983). See id. at 1118-20; see also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973) (allowing a vicarious liability theory in a state court § 1983 claim conflict with the substantive law of § 1983).

58. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
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applied.5 9 As discussed previously, one can also make a strong case
for applying state collateral laws that are consistent with the policies
of § 1983 yet outcome-determinative because they are substantially
more beneficial to § 1983 plaintiffs than federal collateral law. 60 That
leaves only the inconsistent/not outcome-determinative category.
Although Felder could be read as holding that a provision that is inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 but not outcome-determinative
triggers preemption, 61 at this point it can be safely said that at the very
least Felder holds that inconsistency between a state collateral law and
the policies of § 1983 triggers the possibility of preemption, whether
or not the rule is outcome-determinative.
Under this reading of Felder, inconsistency with the policies of
§ 1983 becomes the threshold issue in the converse-Erie context. If a
state collateral law is consistent with the policies of § 1983, it should
be applied regardless of whether it is outcome-determinative. But if a
state collateral law is inconsistent with the policies of § 1983, there is
at least a possibility of preemption. Whether a state collateral law is
outcome-determinative thus becomes a secondary inquiry; standing
alone it tells us nothing about whether a state collateral law should be
preempted or applied.
C. Reconceptualizing the Issue: The Continuum Approach
While Felder treats inconsistency with the policies of § 1983 and
outcome-determination as separate grounds for preemption, it seems
conceptually more attractive to treat them as different degrees of the
same inquiry, that being how far a state collateral rule deviates from
the collateral law applicable in § 1983 litigation in federal court. It is
helpful to conceptualize the problem as existing on a continuum on
which the midpoint is the collateral law applicable in federal court
§ 1983 litigation. 62 A collateral rule applicable in state court § 1983
litigation can be plotted on this continuum according to whether it is
more or less supportive than the federal collateral rules of the compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983, and the degree to which it
59. Considering there are relatively few areas in which the converse-Erie problem arises,
suffice it to say that the consistent and not outcome-determinative category encompasses the
bulk of state collateral law.
60. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. Again, this makes the assumption, previously discussed at supra note 14, that the collateral scheme applicable in federal § 1983 litigation adequately carries out the compensation and
deterrence functions of § 1983. Thus, the collateral law applicable in federal § 1983 can be considered the baseline against which state collateral law is compared.
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differs from the federal collateral law in this respect. 63 The less (or
more 64) supportive the state collateral rule is of the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983, the further away from the center of the
continuum the collateral law is plotted.
As the state collateral law moves further from the federal collateral law midpoint, there will come a point at which the state law can
no longer be termed merely a deviation of the federal law that is less
supportive of the policies of § 1983, but instead becomes inconsistent
with those policies. Yet even further away from the midpoint, the
state collateral law reaches a point where the outcome of the state
court § 1983 litigation will "frequently and predictably" be different
from the outcome in federal court solely because of the state collateral
rule; at that point the law can be said to be outcome-determinative.
More supportive
of the policies
of § 1983

Less supportive
of the policies
of * 1983

(no preemption)

converse-Erie problem
federal
collateral
law

(preempt under Felder)
outcome
determinative

The post-Felder continuum

This continuum analysis serves two important functions. 65 First,
it more accurately reflects the complexity of the converse-Erie problem than does Felder. The continuum approach points out that the
converse-Erie world cannot be neatly divided into two categories, one
where the state collateral rule in question is consistent with the policies of § 1983, and one where it is not. Rather, it recognizes that there
is a range of state collateral rules that must be considered in the converse-Erie analysis: rules that are slightly less supportive of the poli63. If there is no federal collateral rule that corresponds to the state collateral rule, as was
the case in Felder v. Casey, then the state rule must be plotted according to how much it deviates
from there being no rule at all. In doing this, one would ask how much it disadvantages the
§ 1983 plaintiff to have this rule instead of no rule at all.
64. This Note does not directly deal with the "more supportive" side of the midpoint since it
seems fairly clear that such laws should be applied so long as they do not infringe on the substantive law of § 1983. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1115-18, 1130-31.
65. The continuum analysis is similar to how the Supreme Court approaches the statute of
limitations issue in federal § 1983 litigation. Because there is no statute of limitations applicable
to § 1983, the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the alleged violation
occurred governs § 1983 claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), affg, 731 F.2d
640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc). However, it is likely that should a state statute of limitations be
unreasonably short, the Court would preempt it as inconsistent with the policies of § 1983. See
NAHMOD, supra note 25, at 52-54. The Court would allow state statutes of limitations to deviate
within a certain range so long as they did not deviate so far as to be inconsistent with § 1983.
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cies of § 1983 than federal collateral law but still consistent with those
policies; rules that are clearly inconsistent with the policies of § 1983
but do not altogether preclude plaintiffs from vindicating their civil
rights; and rules that are so hostile to § 1983 plaintiffs that they effectively negate any possibility of recovery. By recognizing the complexity of the converse-Erie problem from the outset, the continuum
approach encourages the creation of a solution that is sufficiently flexible to handle the intricacies of the problem.
Second, the continuum approach allows the decision-maker to focus on the core of the converse-Erie problem: How far can state collateral rules disadvantageous to § 1983 plaintiffs deviate from the
federal collateral law baseline without necessitating preemption? Felder clearly tells us that preemption is mandatory when a state collateral law deviates so far from federal collateral law norm that it is
outcome-determinative. 66 But because the Wisconsin notice-of-claim
statute was outcome-determinative, the Felder Court did not articulate
what level of disparity less than outcome-determination mandates
preemption. One possible interpretation of Felder-that state collateral laws even mildly less supportive of the remedial and deterrence
purposes of § 1983 are inconsistent and trigger preemption-suggests
drawing the line very close to the center point.6 7 The narrowest reading of Felder suggests that the line be drawn at the point at which the
state collateral law becomes outcome-determinative. 68 Of course,
there are also a number of choices in between. 69 We now turn to an
analysis of where that line should be drawn.
III.

APPROACHES FOR SOLVING THE LINE-DRAWING PROBLEM

Though Felder v. Casey focuses the spotlight on the interplay of
state and federal collateral law in the § 1983 context, the converseErie problem did not originate in this area.70 Consequently, courts
66. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150-53 (1987).
67. This is Neuborne's individual rights position. See infra Part III.B.
68. This is essentially Hart's plaintiff's choice approach. See infra Part III.A.
69. This would encompass both Herman's balancing-of-interests approach, see supra Part
III.C, and the Felder-based approach, see infra Part III.D.
70. The converse-Erie problem can arise whenever state courts enforce federal rights. Prior
to the reemergence of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledin part by Monell
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The problem most frequently appeared in
cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
The term "converse-Erie" was in fact coined in an article discussing the application of state
collateral law in FELA cases. See Hill, supra note 5.
FELA created concurrent federal jurisdiction in cases involving negligent injury to employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. While early FELA cases heard in state courts
employed state procedural law, see, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211

19971

STATE COURT SECTION 1983 LITIGATION

and commentators have grappled for some time with this problem,
both in the context of § 1983 and otherwise. The following approaches to solving the converse-Erie problem have emerged.
A.

The Plaintiffs Choice Approach

One approach to the § 1983 converse-Erie problem is to not envision it as a problem at all, but rather as a peripheral effect of concurrent jurisdiction under § 1983. This is the approach set forth by
Professor Henry Hart, whose premise regarding the relationship between federal law and the state courts is quite simple: "The general
rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of
state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it
finds them.''71 So long as there is a fair federal forum available, Hart
sees the state courts as a supplemental forum where the plaintiff can
either abide by the state court rules or instead choose the federal forum.72 With a fair federal forum available, a plaintiff would not
choose to litigate her claim in state court with hostile collateral law
unless that state court also had some advantage-procedural or otherwise-over the federal courts. 73 Hart therefore would not allow the
plaintiff to have the advantages of both the state court and the federal
court when it was the plaintiff's choice as to where to litigate in the
first place; she must weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the state court collateral law vis-t-vis the collateral law available in
federal court, and choose the forum in which she wishes to proceed.
Once that decision is made, the plaintiff must live with the rules of the
forum she has chosen. 74 However, Hart points out that two minimum
(1916) (state law allowing a non-unanimous jury could be used in a state court FELA action),
later cases required state courts to use federal procedures that would advantage plaintiffs. See,

e.g., Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (state cannot use strict pleading
rules in a FELA case because it unnecessarily burdens the federal right to recovery).
71. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 508 (1954).

72. See id.
73. For example, a plaintiff may choose to bring a § 1983 action in a state court despite a
disadvantageous collateral rule because the state court has already favorably ruled on a right in
question. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 731.

74. This very approach was urged by Justice O'Connor in her Felder dissent:
A plaintiff who chooses to bring a § 1983 action in state court necessarily rejects the
federal courts that Congress has provided. Virtually the only conceivable reason for
doing so is to benefit from procedural advantages available exclusively in state court.
Having voted with their feet for state procedural systems, such plaintiffs would hardly

be in a position to ask Congress for a new type of forum that combines the advantages
that Congress gave them in the federal system with those that Congress did not give
them, and which are only available in state courts.
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 163 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:875

requirements must be met: the plaintiff must have access to a fair
federal forum in which to pursue the federally-created remedy, and
the state collateral rules cannot be "so rigorous as, in effect, to nullify
'75
the asserted rights.
Hart's "plaintiff's choice approach" has a strong common sense
appeal. It is the free market applied to the judicial process: the plaintiff has a choice of two "products," each with advantages and disadvantages, and she must purchase one or the other. And just as in the
free market where a consumer has no right to force one seller to add a
feature to its product because the feature would make the product
more attractive to the consumer, Hart's argument is that a § 1983
plaintiff should not be able to force state courts to adopt "better" procedures from the federal court system just because those procedures
would be beneficial to the plaintiff.
Hart's plaintiff's choice approach is also appealing because it embraces one of the central tenets of federalism: encouraging experimentation by state governments. 76 Most notably, allowing state courts
to define and apply their own collateral law enables the state courts to
act as small-scale laboratories for experimenting with alternative judicial procedure. This is desirable in our system of federalism because
experimentation at the state level could foreseeably create a superior
77
system of collateral law that could be adopted by the federal courts.
At an even more general level, federalism interests are served by
the plaintiff's choice approach because it maintains-or at least prevents the further erosion of-the balance of power between the federal and state governments. 78 Unlike other branches of state
government, state courts remain relatively independent from federal
oversight in their day-to-day functioning, and as such are one of the
75. Hart, supra note 71, at 508.
76.

See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (2d ed. 1991). The impor-

tance of experimentation by state governments is expressed well by Justice Brandeis: "It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
77. This argument is weakened somewhat by the option of a more moderate regime which
allows the application of a state collateral rule which is outcome-determinative because it is
more generous to plaintiffs than federal collateral law, but not a state collateral rule that is
outcome-determinative in the other direction. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. In
such a regime, "good" experimentation would be allowed and "bad" experimentation would not
be allowed, meaning the nation at large could still reap the benefits of the "good" state
experimentation.
78. See Margaret G. Stewart, Federalismand Supremacy: A Control of State JudicialDecision-Making, 68 Ca.-KEr L. REV. 431, 444 (1992).
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last refuges into which federal power has not crept.79 Moreover,
states have a difficult-to-articulate but nonetheless real interest in controlling the "housekeeping functions" of their own state courts.8 0 By
applying state collateral law, even if at the expense of the § 1983 cause
of action, the plaintiff's choice approach reaffirms the autonomy of
8
the state judiciary. 1
Hart's approach does, however, have some significant drawbacks.
Most importantly, it undervalues the federal right of recovery established by § 1983 by assuming that the state interest in following its
own collateral law is superior to the federal interest in remedying and
deterring civil rights violations through § 1983. The plaintiff's choice
approach conceptualizes state judicial autonomy as the framework
into which the policies of § 1983 must be accommodated; the § 1983
claim must fit into the existing state collateral scheme, or it must be
brought in federal court. However, the history of § 1983 indicates that
it would be more appropriate to consider the § 1983 right of recovery
as paramount compared to state judicial autonomy, and that the
proper solution of the converse-Erie problem would be to make the
state courts accommodate § 1983.
Section 1983 was enacted primarily to make available a federal
remedy for civil rights violations where a state remedy was available
in theory but not in practice. 82 The problem which § 1983 was supposed to solve was not that state laws explicitly prevented the vindication of civil rights, 83 but rather that states were unwilling or unable to
protect individuals' constitutional rights because of the prejudices of
juries and judges. 84 The only readily available solution was to create

79. See id.
80. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1097. Herman argues that states have an interest in following their own rules because the rules are familiar, because doing so encourages efficiency by
ensuring that all claims within a case are subject to the same rules, and because the rules may be

well-suited to a state or court. See id. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, states arguably have
a dignitary interest in creating and following their own collateral law.
81. Stewart also raises the argument that while Congress undeniably has power under the
Supremacy Clause to force states to enforce federally created rights, it may act unconstitutionally when it forces state courts to apply rules that are outside the substantive content of § 1983.
See Stewart, supra note 78, at 438-40.

82. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
83. Although overriding state laws that prevented the vindication of civil rights was cited as

one of three major reasons for the enactment of § 1983, see id. at 173-74, at least one senator
argued that this was irrelevant because no such laws existed. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 268-69 (1871) (statement of Rep. Sloss).

84. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176-77.
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an alternative federal forum.85 Not surprisingly, this proposed solution was met with strong protests that it infringed on the powers reserved to the states. 86 Despite the protests, the enactors saw the
ability of plaintiffs to vindicate their civil rights as more important
than exclusive state judicial control over intrastate civil rights claims,
and created an alternative federal forum via § 1983 so civil rights
87
claims could be fairly heard.
In the converse-Erie context, a different but related question
arises: As between state control over state collateral law and the ability of plaintiffs to effectively vindicate their civil rights, which is paramount? Given that the Forty-second Congress made the decision in
1871 that citizens must have the ability to vindicate their civil rights
even at the sacrifice of state judicial control over claims that could be
brought in state court, the § 1983 right of recovery is, all the more so,
paramount vis-A-vis state control over collateral law applicable in
§ 1983 state court litigation. Otherwise stated, if something has to
give, it should be state control over the collateral law applicable in
state court § 1983 actions rather than the § 1983 right of recovery.
Another fundamental criticism of the plaintiff's choice approach
is that it would allow the states to have too much control over federally created rights. It is undeniable that as between federal law and
state law, the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law is
supreme. 88 It is also quite clear that states may establish their own
85. Indeed the solution would have been easy if it was state law that was preventing individuals from vindicating their civil rights: the problem could have been solved by preempting the
state law Supremacy Clause as conflicting with the Fourteenth Amendment.
86. The remarks of Representative Arthur are, indeed, representative:
[Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (which later became § 1983)] overrides the
reserved powers of the States. It reaches out and draws within the despotic circle of
central power all the domestic, internal, and local institutions and offices of the States,

and then asserts over them an arbitrary and paramount control as of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected, in a peculiar sense, by the United States
and the citizens thereof. Having done this, having swallowed up the States and their
institutions, tribunals and functions, it leaves them the shadow of what they once were.

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1871); see also id. at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id. at

app. 86-87 (remarks of Rep. Storm); id. at app. 50 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 365-66 (remarks
of Rep. Arthur); id. at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); id. at 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis); id. at
396 (remarks of Sen. Rice); id. at app. 91 (remarks of Rep. Duke); id. at app. 112 (remarks of

Rep. Moore); id. at app. 117-18 (remarks of Sen. Blair); id. at app. 148 (remarks of Rep.
Lamison); id. at app. 179 (remarks of Rep. Voorhees); id. at app. 304 (remarks of Rep. Slater).
See generally Blackmun, supra note 17, at 6-7.

87. One can only speculate what the Forty-second Congress would have done if it could
have solved its problem by simply ordering that state courts follow certain federal collateral
rules when hearing civil rights claims, but it does seem likely that usurping state procedure in
certain cases would have been a more moderate solution than effectively taking control of intrastate civil rights disputes away from the state courts altogether.

88. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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collateral law schemes to govern litigation in their state courts.8 9
However, when state courts are called upon to enforce federal rights,
the validity of the latter statement becomes less clear because state
procedure can affect the enforcement of the federal right. When federal claims are adjudicated in state court, the state collateral rules that
legitimately apply to all state court litigation can so erode the federal
right that the federal right must trump the state collateral rules under
the Supremacy Clause.
This is precisely how the Supreme Court has handled cases
brought in state courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.90
Of particular interest is Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,91 a
1949 case in which the Supreme Court preempted Georgia's strict
pleading rules because they deprived the plaintiff the opportunity to
recover under FELA.92 As Justice Black explained:
Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary
burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.
"Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal
rights, when plainly and reasonably
made, is not to be defeated
'93
under the name of local practice."

Other Supreme Court FELA cases have reached similar results. 94
The plaintiffs choice approach, on the other hand, would allow
state collateral law to control the federal right of recovery so long as
the federal right is not nullified. 95 Hart intimates that the Brown decision was wrong, and that Georgia's strict pleading rules should have
governed even if that meant a different result than the one likely had
the Brown litigation taken place in federal court. 96 Hart would have
allowed Georgia's local rules to erode the federal right, so long as it
89. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
90. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). For an explanation of the substance of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, see supra note 70.
91. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
92. In Brown, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured in the performance of his duties as a
railroad employee when he stepped on an object negligently left by his employer alongside a
track in the railroad yard. Id. at 295. The Georgia courts, relying on Georgia's strict pleading
requirements, held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim because his complaint neither
alleged the absence of plaintiff's contributory negligence nor specifically alleged that the object
over which the plaintiff stumbled was left where it was because of the railroad company's negligence. See id.
93. See id. at 298-99 (quoting Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923)).
94. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (FELA plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding a local rule to the contrary); Bailey v. Central Vt.
Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943) (notwithstanding local rules, state courts are disallowed from granting a
directed verdict for employers in FELA cases).
95. See Hart, supra note 71, at 508.
96. See id. at 508 n.60 and accompanying text.
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did not destroy that right completely. His approach there, as well as
to the § 1983 converse-Erie problem, can be criticized for failing to
consider the importance of federal rights vis-t-vis state collateral rules
that undoubtedly affect the ability of plaintiffs to recover under that
federal right.
The Felder Court expressly rejected the plaintiff's choice approach in its pure form. 97 Hart's approach was the foundation on
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court built its decision that the noticeof-claim statute was applicable in the § 1983 context. 98 This argument
was, however, expressly rejected on appeal as the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the states' right to define and apply its
own collateral law was not absolute:
However equitable [the Wisconsin Supreme Court's] bitter-withthe-sweet argument may appear in the abstract, it has no place
under our Supremacy Clause analysis. Federal law takes state
courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that
do not "impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws." 99
While the plaintiff's choice in its purest form may be dead so far
as the majority of the Supreme Court is concerned, it nonetheless lives
on for purposes of the converse-Erie analysis by providing the theoretical underpinning for drawing the preemption line at a maximum
distance from the federal collateral law midpoint. The point of outcome-determination would mean nothing to Hart, who would allow
state collateral law to deviate from the federal collateral law so long as
it did not nullify the federal right. However, given the Supreme
Court's holding in Felder, the plaintiff's choice approach would be
positioned on the post-Feldercontinuum so as to not preempt a state
collateral rule unless it was outcome-determinative.
B.

The Individual Rights Approach

At the other end of the continuum is the "individual rights approach" promoted by Professor Burt Neuborne. 00 Neuborne's pri97. The Felder majority opinion actually summarized the Wisconsin position by quoting
Hart, then explicitly rejected the argument. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988).
98. "The point we wish to reiterate is simply that litigants who choose to press their claims
in state court cannot 'elect' to ignore state procedural rules. The right to sue in state court is
accompanied by the corollary duty to abide by certain rules and procedures. [The notice-ofclaim statute] is an example of just such a procedure." Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19,25 (Wis.
1987).

99. Felder, 487 U.S. at 150 (quoting Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1949)).
100. See generally Neuborne, supra note 4.
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mary focus is the protection of the rights of the individual against the
will of the collective. 101 Although he has previously argued that federal courts are institutionally superior to state courts in adjudicating
civil rights claims, 10 2 Neuborne nonetheless places a high value on
concurrent jurisdiction because of its potential value as a "self-correcting constitutional compass, guiding litigation into the forum most
likely to enunciate an expansive definition of the rights of the individual. 1' 0 3 Neuborne's ideal scenario, then, is one in which federal and
state courts are equally competent in adjudicating civil rights claims,
with the two forums "competing" for civil rights plaintiffs via the substantive law available in each.1°4
However, even assuming substantive parity, Neuborne argues
that three collateral law considerations still force § 1983 plaintiffs into
federal court. 0 5 First, federal collateral law is uniform throughout the
United States and thus allows a relatively small and centralized civil
rights bar to apply one set of rules wherever they litigate.' °6 To litigate § 1983 claims in state court, on the other hand, this small group
of civil rights attorneys would have to expend valuable resources on
learning the diverse collateral law schemes of the states in which they
wish to litigate. Secondly, because federal collateral law is applicable
in all federal litigation, civil rights litigators quickly become familiar
with it and learn to apply it masterfully. 0 7 The same cannot be said of
101. This is manifest in Neubome's definition of the "better" forum for adjudicating civil
rights claims "as the one more likely to assign a very high value to the protection of the individual, even the unreasonable or dangerous individual, against the collective, so that the definition
of the individual right in question will receive its most expansive reading and its most energetic
enforcement." Id. at 727.
102. Neubome lays out this theory in his seminal article, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L
REV. 1105 (1977). Neuborne argues that federal courts are institutionally superior to state courts
for three reasons: federal judges are more technically competent than judges in the state courts;
the "psychological set" of federal judges is more amenable, compared to the psychological set of
state court judges, to the liberal values protected by civil rights litigation; and federal judges are
more apt than state judges to make difficult and unpopular civil rights decisions because federal
judges are insulated from majoritarian pressures. See id. at 1118-28.
103. Neubome, supra note 4, at 731. In this sense, Neuborne's approach-like Hart's-is
analogous to a free market, with the federal and state courts "competing" for plaintiffs by offering ease of recovery. However, the free market analogy is eroded by the fact that even if a
plaintiff chooses to file a § 1983 in state court the defendant can remove to federal court.
104. See id. By substantive law, Neuborne does not mean the substantive law of § 1983,
which is interpreted by the federal courts and binding on the state courts. Rather, Neuborne
argues that a state court may have previously ruled favorably on a certain substantive right
(whether on state or federal constitutional grounds, or because the federal courts may appear to
be hostile to a certain right).
105. See id.at 733-47.
106. See id. at 733-34.
107. See id.at 734-35. Neubore points out that one contributing factor is that law schools
generally require students to take a course in federal civil procedure, but not state procedure.
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the diverse collateral law schemes of different states. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Neuborne argues that federal collateral law is
generally more hospitable to plaintiffs than is state collateral law. 10 8
This encourages § 1983 plaintiffs to opt to litigate their civil rights
claims in the federal courts, where they are less likely to lose because
of a particular collateral law. 10 9 To keep plaintiffs from avoiding state
courts because of a disadvantageous collateral rule, Neuborne suggests that the collateral law applicable in all § 1983 litigation, whether
in federal or state court, should be uniform and hospitable. 110 In
other words, Neuborne envisions procedural parity as a prerequisite
to making a system of concurrent jurisdiction work effectively.
In addition to seeing procedural parity as normatively attractive,
Neuborne argues that it is the proper result based on an analysis of
the collateral law applicable when other federal rights are enforced in
state courts,"' in diversity cases, 112 and when 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is used
108. See id. at 735.
109. Neuborne cites six specific areas in which the collateral laws of most states are hostile to
civil rights plaintiffs: (1) pleadings; (2) statute of limitations; (3) class actions; (4) official immunity; (5) discovery; and (6) attorney's fees. See id. at 735-47. Since Neuborne wrote his article in
1981, Supreme Court decisions have absorbed some of these areas into the substantive law of
§ 1983, and thus precluded states from applying their own rules in state court § 1983 actions.
These areas include statute of limitations, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); official
immunity, see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 227 (1980);
and attorney's fees. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
110. Aside from the argument that "competing" federal and state forums will be good for
§ 1983 plaintiffs, Neuborne also asserts that there are good reasons why plaintiffs and the community as a whole would be better served if civil rights cases could be effectively litigated in state
rather than federal courts. These include time and monetary savings (Neuborne points out that
in his experience 25 % of federal court civil rights litigation is devoted to federalism issues which
would not be relevant in state court); that state court judges could more harmoniously check
local majorities than could "outsider" federal judges; and that state court judges have more remedies available to them than do federal judges, who are restricted by Article III requirements.
See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 731-32.
111. See id at 770-75. Herman argues that these cases, particularly the ones brought under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, are not analogous to the § 1983 converse-Erie problem.
See Herman, supra note 4, at 1107. First, she argues that nationwide uniformity was a central
aim of the FELA legislation, so it was logical to apply the same procedure wherever the case was
heard. See id. Uniformity, on the other hand, has never been an articulated aim of § 1983.
Second, Herman argues that the statutory scheme of FELA differs from § 1983 in two ways.
Because the FELA statutory scheme gave plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum which § 1983
did not give civil rights plaintiffs, Herman argues that unlike FELA where a defendant was
trapped in state court, it makes no sense to force federal procedures on state courts where a
defendant can "escape" to federal court if he wishes. See id. at 1108. Moreover, Herman sees
§ 1988 as showing Congressional intent to rely at least on occasion on state law in the § 1983
setting, whereas there was no similar provision in FELA. See id.
112. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 776-77. Herman disputes Neuborne's claim that the
diversity cases are analogous to § 1983 claims being heard in state court. See Herman, supra
note 4, at 1109-13. First, Herman argues that Congress' power to force federal procedure on
state courts in the converse-Erie analysis is more questionable than Congress' power to subject
state law claims to federal procedure when those claims are being heard in federal court. See id.
at 1111. She also argues that the comity concerns that troubled the federal courts in the Erie
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to fill gaps in federal court § 1983 litigation. 113 Neuborne concludes
that the cross-forum applicability of collateral law in each of these
three areas converges into one rule:
[W]henever the generative jurisdiction enjoys constitutional primacy in a given area of lawmaking, the forum jurisdiction must apply the collateral rule of the generative jurisdiction if it is likely to
exert a substantial impact on the preincident behavior of the targets
of the cause of action or if it is likely to affect the ability114of the
beneficiaries of the cause of action to enjoy its full benefit.
Neuborne then proposes that this general rule be applied to the
§ 1983 converse-Erie problem as follows:
[I]f the application of a collateral rule of the state forum would be
likely to permit behavior which the section 1983 cause of action was
designed to deter ... the collateral rule of the state forum [must]
give way to the collateral rule of the generative jurisdiction. Similarly, if the collateral rule of the state forum is likely to inhibit the
class of persons who are the intended beneficiaries of section 1983
from enjoying its protection, the forum's rule should be 1displaced
by
5
the more hospitable rule of the generative jurisdiction.
The result of this approach, according to Neuborne, would be "the
emergence of a uniform and hospitable body of collateral rules governing the litigation of federal constitutional claims in both state and
116
federal courts."
From the perspective of the § 1983 plaintiff, Neuborne's individual rights approach has much to offer. The individual rights approach
would maximize the remedial and deterrence functions of § 1983 by
preempting any state collateral laws that would be likely to stand between a § 1983 plaintiff and the vindication of her civil rights. In theory, more plaintiffs would be able to recover under § 1983 because
plaintiffs could reap the benefits of state substantive law without being
forced to abide by disadvantageous state collateral law."17 Additioncases cut the other way when a federal cause of action is being forced on state courts, that unlike
diversity cases the state forum is not disinterested in the § 1983 converse-Erie context, and that
forcing federal procedure on state courts would have a more drastic effect on state court dockets
than the Erie rule has had on the federal dockets. See id. Finally, Herman argues that the
diversity cases are inconsistent with the FELA cases in that while the diversity cases respect the
host forum, the FELA cases show a willingness to override host forum rules. See id. at 1112. For
Herman, this latter point indicates that converse-Erie and diversity cases, while "interesting and
instructive experiences with similar problems, do not provide any simple answers." Id. at 1113.
113. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 778-79.
114. Id. at 779-80.
115. Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. This may be true, however, in theory only. Since § 1983 defendants have the right to
remove cases to federal courts, it is unlikely that a defendant would allow litigation to remain in
a state forum that is so plaintiff-friendly.
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ally, assuming the validity of Neuborne's observations about the tendency of civil rights lawyers to migrate to a forum with uniform and
familiar collateral law, federalism interests would also be served by
Neuborne's approach because more civil rights litigation between intrastate parties could take place without resorting to the "outsider"
federal courts. 118 A peripheral advantage of each of these considerations is that as more § 1983 cases are litigated in state courts, the burden § 1983 places on overcrowded federal dockets would be eased.
From the states' rights perspective, the individual rights approach
is not nearly so preferable. Under Neuborne's approach, state collateral law must give way at the first indication that it would likely affect
the ability of § 1983 to compensate or deter. Consequently, it would
preclude states from experimenting with their collateral law schemes,
shift the balance of power even more toward the federal government
compared to the states, and discount the interests-dignitary and
otherwise-that states have in controlling their own housekeeping
functions. 119
A more glaring problem with the individual rights approach is the
incompatibility between the test Neuborne articulates and the goals
he sets out. Consider the case of a state collateral rule that is more
generous to a § 1983 plaintiff than the collateral law that would have
been applicable in federal court § 1983 litigation. Under Neuborne's
test, the law would not be preempted because it would not be likely to
permit behavior which § 1983 was designed to deter, and it would not
be likely to inhibit plaintiffs from benefitting from the protection of
§ 1983. However, such a result is at odds with Neuborne's concern
that § 1983 litigation is kept out of state court because of uniformity
and familiarity principles; civil rights litigators would still have to navigate the collateral law nuances of each state in which they wish to
bring § 1983 claims. 120
It seems, then, that Neuborne's prediction that his test would lead
to "the emergence of a uniform and hospitable body of collateral rules
118. According to Neuborne, this would be true even if state substantive law was only
equivalent to federal substantive law because attorneys would rather litigate in a forum with
which they are most familiar, and most attorneys are more familiar with state than federal forums. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 732.
119. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.

120. One could argue that this is of little consequence since civil rights litigators accustomed
to a uniform set of collateral rules would in all likelihood be able to meet the requirements of a
more generous state collateral rule simply by meeting the requirements of the rules to which
they are accustomed. While this may be true, unless civil rights litigators became familiar with
the nuances of the collateral law of each state, they would be precluded from using generous
state collateral law to the advantage of their clients.
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governing the litigation of federal constitutional claims in both state
and federal courts"'121 is flatly wrong. Neuborne presupposes that federal collateral law is superior to state collateral law, 122 and he thus
designs his test to preempt state collateral rules which would inhibit
recovery under § 1983. But when it comes to state collateral laws that
are more generous to § 1983 plaintiffs than federal collateral law,
Neuborne's test, as it stands, cannot provide for both uniformity and
maximum hospitality-one or the other must give way. If it is uniformity that is deemed paramount, then Neuborne's approach would
lead, at best, to federal collateral law being applicable in all § 1983
litigation, regardless of whether a state collateral rule would be more
beneficial to the plaintiff. 23 Ironically, despite Neuborne's dedication
to the protection of individual rights, if the uniformity and familiarity
principles are to be taken seriously the individual rights approach
would put a ceiling on the hospitality available to persons bringing
§ 1983 claims in state court. If, on the other hand, it is maximum hospitality that is paramount, then the uniformity and familiarity con124
cerns must be sacrificed.
Another criticism of Neuborne's individual rights approach is
that while it promotes interstate uniformity of procedure and result, it
125
could at the same time cause a uniformity problem for state courts.
For example, if a § 1983 claim was being heard in state court in conjunction with other state claims, and a state had a collateral rule that
failed Neuborne's test and thus necessitated preemption, federal collateral law would have to be used for the § 1983 claim but not the
state claims. This would leave different collateral law applicable to
121. Neuborne, supra note 4, at 780.
122. See id.at 735-37.
123. In 1981, when he proposed the individual rights approach, such a result would have
pleased Neuborne, who sweepingly observed that federal collateral law is more generous to
§ 1983 plaintiffs than is state collateral law. See id. at 735-47.
124. This would seem to be the better approach because the number of state collateral laws
that are more generous to § 1983 plaintiffs-those specific rules that civil rights attorneys accustomed to federal law would have to learn and master-would likely be few in number. Moreover, it is hard to imagine federal civil rights advocates unwilling to learn collateral rules that are
favorable to their clients. On the other hand, if uniformity is considered paramount, state court
civil rights plaintiffs would be limited to the generosity of the federal collateral rules, even if the
state rules were more beneficial to § 1983 plaintiffs.
125. It is important to note that uniformity of procedure and uniformity of result are distinct
concerns. This distinction is important in that the Felder Court's emphasis on uniformity of
result could be accomplished without mandating uniformity of procedure. This could be done by
allowing the application of state collateral rules less supportive of the policies of § 1983 than
federal rules, so long as those state rules are not outcome-determinative. Neuborne, on the
other hand, argues that disparity of procedure should not be allowed because it drives civil rights
cases into federal court. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 733-37.
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different counts within the same case, 126 and could cause confusion by

127
exposing all parties to potentially contradictory legal commands.
While it is doubtful that such a plaintiff-friendly approach would
be adopted by the current Supreme Court, Neuborne's individual
rights approach nonetheless informs the converse-Erie analysis by
providing the rationale for drawing the line of preemption very near
the federal collateral law midpoint. Because of his concern for the
ability of plaintiffs to recover under § 1983, Neuborne would allow a
state collateral rule that is disadvantageous to § 1983 plaintiffs to deviate very little before preempting that rule in favor of the federal collateral rule.

C. The Balancing-of-InterestsApproach
While Hart and Neuborne approach the § 1983 converse-Erie
problem from diametrically opposite perspectives-Hart focusing exclusively on state autonomy and Neuborne focusing solely on the
§ 1983 right of recovery-Professor Susan Herman has proposed an
approach that purports to steer a path between the Hart and
Neuborne positions. 128 Rather than abide by one rule of general applicability, Herman's "balancing-of-interests" approach would weigh
the pertinent federal and state interests on a case-by-case basis to decide whether a specific state collateral law should be preempted or
applied in § 1983 state court litigation.
A discussion of this balancing-of-interests approach must begin
by identifying the interests to be balanced. For Herman, the only federal interest at stake in the § 1983 converse-Erie context is preventing
the states from applying collateral law that would defeat the § 1983
right to recovery. 29 She chooses this narrower formulation over a
more broadly defined federal interest in compelling state courts to apply federal collateral law that would enhance the ability to recover
126. Herman describes the problem as follows: "Borrowing federal procedure on one out of
two or three claims in a case might lead to a situation in which the federal claim is entitled to

class action treatment, or a jury trial, and the state claims are not. Must there be two trials, or
might the plaintiff get a jury trial on a state law issue simply because section 1983 was invoked in
the complaint?" Herman, supra note 4, at 1099. For one way the Supreme Court might handle
this issue, see McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), which held that where
a federal and state law claim are being heard in a state court, the statute of limitations applicable
to the federal claim should also govern the state claim so as to maximize the federal right.
127. A comment by Hart is relevant here: "People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov's dogs,
to two or more inconsistent sets of directions.., could not fail in the end to react as the dogs did.

The society, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown." Hart, supra note 71, at 489.
128. See generally Herman, supra note 4.
129. See id. at 1094-95. This narrow formulation also reflects Herman's belief that deterrence-not compensation-is the paramount goal of § 1983. See id. at 1095.
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under § 1983.130 Herman chooses the more modest formulation because of Congressional silence regarding § 1983 state court litigation, 131 and because the modest definition of the federal interest
allows for accommodation of state interests and the basic tenets of
federalism. 132
Also significant is Herman's conclusion that uniformity of result
between federal and state § 1983 litigation need not be weighed on
the federal side of the scale. Herman argues that disparate outcomes
resulting from a neutral state collateral law that happens to disadvantage § 1983 plaintiffs should be of no concern in the § 1983 converseErie context. 133 While Herman would preempt state justiciability doctrines that tend to keep plaintiffs out of court,134 Herman lists several
reasons why a single-minded reverence for federal-state uniformity is
unwarranted. First, preempting state collateral law to promote uniformity in a state court § 1983 claim could result in disparity of procedure between the § 1983 claim and other claims at issue in the same
suit. 135 Second, uniformity would not lead to enhanced deterrence because no matter how antiplaintiff state collateral law is, § 1983 plaintiffs always have the prerogative to file suit in federal court. 136 Next,
Herman takes issue with the Felder court's argument that collateral
law unfavorable to plaintiffs will disserve federalism interests by keeping plaintiffs out of state courts. She counters that since state collateral law favorable to plaintiffs may tempt plaintiffs as well as repel
them, forced uniformity could disserve federalism interests by disallowing state legislatures from attracting § 1983 plaintiffs with plaintifffriendly collateral law. 137 Finally, Herman argues that fear of forumshopping is no reason to force uniformity since forums "competing" to
attract § 1983 plaintiffs may enable plaintiffs a better opportunity to
vindicate their civil rights.138
130. See id.
131. Herman is unabashedly critical of the Supreme Court's "psychic divining" of Congressional intent regarding § 1983 state court litigation. See id. at 1091.
132. See id. at 1094-95.
133. See generally id. at 1098-1104.
134. See id. at 1098, 1114, 1123-24. Thus, even for Herman, Felder v. Casey is an easy case if
one sees the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute as tending to keep plaintiffs of court.
135. See id. at 1099.
136. See id.

137. See id. at 1100. This argument loses weight, however, if only state collateral laws that
disadvantage plaintiffs are preempted while collateral laws that advantage plaintiffs are
applicable.
138. See id. at 1100-02. Herman adds that forum-shopping cannot be completely eliminated
in any concurrent jurisdiction scheme. See id. at 1101.
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As for the state interests to be weighed, Herman argues that
states have a number of legitimate and cognizable interests in following their own procedural schemes.
These interests include the state court's interest in following its own
rules because those rules are familiar, because they are the rules
possibly being applied to other claims in the same case and, therefore, will promote efficient litigation, because the rules may be well
adapted to that particular state or court, and because of the dignitary interest
the states have in making their own procedural
139
decisions.

Herman does not, however, include among the legitimate state inter140
ests the protection of state actors from § 1983 liability.
For the purpose of illustrating how the balance-of-interests approach might come out in specific cases, Herman then divides potential § 1983 converse-Erie problems into four categories: 14 ' (1) state
justiciability doctrine less restrictive than federal justiciability doctrine; (2) state justiciability doctrine more restrictive than federal justiciability doctrine; (3) state procedure more favorable to plaintiffs
than federal procedure; and (4) state procedure less favorable to
plaintiffs than federal procedure. 42 Categories one and three would
be relatively easy cases for Herman since both federal and state interests would be served by applying the state collateral law. 43 Category
two cases are also easy for Herman: these restrictive state justiciability doctrines must be preempted because they are invariably
44
outcome-determinative and thus are inconsistent with § 1983.
As for category four,145 Herman argues the balancing-of-interests
approach would dictate that
[i]f a procedure cannot be characterized as advantaging or disadvantaging plaintiffs, outside the context of a particular case, the
state should not be prohibited from using its own neutral rules. If a
139. Id. at 1097.

140. See id at 1096-98.
141. Herman also discusses state collateral law that is more favorable to § 1983 plaintiffs

than the substantive law of § 1983. See id. at 1118-20. Though she predicts that the Supreme
Court would likely preempt such laws under the Supremacy Clause, she proposes two ways that
these laws could be allowed to stand: (1) the Supreme Court could cut back on the substantive

law of § 1983 it creates, and thus leave room for the states to be more generous with their
collateral law; or (2) the Court could adopt the admittedly radical approach of allowing states to

use collateral law more favorable to plaintiffs even if that law conflicts with the settled substantive law of § 1983. See id. at 1119-20.
142. See id. at 1063.
143. See id. at 1116, 1130-31.
144. See id. at 1124.
145. The § 1983 converse-Erie problems Herman places in category four are those at issue in
this Note, specifically state collateral law that is less favorable to plaintiffs than that available in
federal court, but is not so disadvantageous as to be characterized as outcome-determinative.
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rule might be thought to be disadvantageous to plaintiffs, that does
not end the inquiry into whether the state may be permitted to use
its own procedure, but is the beginning of a process of analysis and
balancing.
My balance of the relevant interests maintains a presumption in
favor of state court procedures.., that is overcome only
14 if the procedure is inherently hostile to section 1983 plaintiffs.
Herman does not specifically define "inherently hostile," although she
points out that "a procedure that is generally and predictably adverse
to plaintiffs might be impermissible."' 147 Additional guidance is provided by Herman's analysis of strict state pleading rules, which she
concludes are not inherently inconsistent with the policies of § 1983
because they can be overcome by competent counsel. 148 Apparently,
Herman's "inherently hostile" standard would preempt more state
collateral law than Hart's "nullification of the federal right" standard,
but judging from her discussion of strict pleading rules she would draw
the line in the same vicinity. 149 Herman envisions this deference to
the state collateral law as a quid pro quo for state generosity in categories one and three:
[I]f a state procedure is neutral, not inconsistent with the goals of
section 1983 and serves a strong enough legitimate state interest
that the state courts wish to insist on its application, allowing the
state courts to apply a procedure plaintiffs might dislike may be sim150
ply the other side of the coin of allowing state court generosity.
Because Herman's balancing-of-interests approach admittedly
would lead to results similar to Hart's plaintiff's choice approach, it
shares many of the same strengths and criticisms that were made
about that approach in Part III.A. One significant achievement of the
balancing-of-interesting approach is that it, unlike Hart or Neuborne's
approaches, considers both the valid federal and state interests at
stake. As such, it more accurately reflects the complexity of the converse-Erie issue, which cannot-and should not-be a "winner-takeall" approach where either the state or federal interest wins out without first considering the interests of the other. Rather, as Herman
suggests, competing considerations must be taken into account.
146. Herman, supra note 4, at 1133.
147. Id. at 1131.
148. See id. at 1132-33. Herman also concludes that pleading rules regarding relation back of
amendments and the commencement of a suit are not inherently hostile to § 1983 plaintiffs because both plaintiffs and defendants could be disadvantaged by the rules. See id. at 1131-32.
149. See id. at 1131-34.
150. Id. at 1114. Herman's use of the phrase "not inconsistent" is perplexing in that elsewhere in the article she seemingly would apply state collateral rules that are somewhat inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 so long as it is not "inherently hostile."
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But while Herman purports to balance federal and state interests,
her narrow conceptualization of the federal interest at stake predetermines the outcome of the "balancing" in favor of the application of
the state collateral law. By defining the federal interest as preventing
states from applying collateral rules that defeat the § 1983 right to recovery, and then asserting that the state interest in applying its own
collateral scheme is legitimate, Herman rigs the scale so that the state
interest in applying its own collateral rules will, except when the state
rule will defeat the § 1983 right, outweigh the federal interest. This is
so because she defines the federal interest in the negative; it only has
weight when another condition, here a state collateral law that threatens to defeat the § 1983 right, exists. 151 Consequently, Herman's approach is akin to categorical balancing, not balancing on a case-bycase basis as she claims, because the determinative inquiry is whether
a state collateral law will defeat the § 1983 right of recovery. 152 If the
answer is no, the state collateral law is applicable. If the answer is yes,
the state collateral rule is preempted. As such, the balancing-of-interests approach is little more than Hart's plaintiff's choice approach
dressed up as a balancing test-the outcome depends only on whether
the federal right will be defeated. 53
151. For Herman, a law that will defeat the federal right of recovery is one that is "inherently
hostile" to § 1983. See id. at 1133.
152. An analogy may be helpful. Suppose a parent must decide whether a particular item of
food should be fed to her child. The decision will depend on how the parent defines the interests
involved. At the most basic level, a parent might believe it is appropriate to feed the food to the
child unless it will somehow cause the child harm, irrespective of whether the food is nutritionally good for the child, etc. Thus, the parent's decision depends on a determination of whether
the food will cause harm to the child. The same result could be expressed as a categorical balancing test in which the parent weighs the child's interest in gratifying an immediate craving to
eat against the parent's interest in not having the child eat food that will harm the child. In any
given case, the outcome depends on the parent's determination whether or not the food will
harm the child. If it will, the child does not eat the food.
Suppose another parent defines the parental interest as ensuring that the child gets the
proper amount of carbohydrates, calcium, calories, fat, etc. In such a case, the balancing must be
done on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the particular food in question. The existence of a single
condition does not control because the nutritional value of the food mnust be weighed against the
child's immediate craving for it.
The difference between the two hypotheticals is that in the first the parental interest is
defined in the negative, and thus depends on the existence of the condition that the parent does
not want to happen. In the second, the parental interest is defined positively, and so in any given
case there will be some parental interest to weigh.
Herman's balancing-of-interests approach, which defines the government interest as
preventing states from applying collateral rules that defeat the policies of § 1983, is thus categorical because the outcome depends not on weighing on a case-by-case basis, but rather on the
existence of a condition, specifically the existence of a state collateral rule that defeats the § 1983
right.
153. To Herman's credit she seems to be willing to use a more liberal standard of the definition of "defeating" a federal right-"inherently hostile"-compared to Hart's virtually unreachable "nullification of the right" standard.
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Another weakness of the balancing-of-interests approach is the
vagueness and subjectivity of the "inherently hostile" standard. Unlike Hart or Neuborne, who are quite clear about where lines should
be drawn, Herman's "inherently hostile" standard does not provide
meaningful guidance to state court judges faced with a § 1983 converse-Erie question. 154 Judges would still face the difficult decision of
whether a particular law is "inherently hostile" to the policies of
§ 1983. While Herman's balancing-of-interests approach is arguably
sound in the abstract-even if it is underconsiderate of the federal
interest-it would not provide judges sitting in a courtroom with an
easy-to-use tool for making difficult collateral law decisions. 155
Unlike either Hart or Neuborne, it is difficult to abstractly place
Herman's balancing-of-interests approach on the post-Felder continuum because of her vague "inherently hostile" standard. Nonetheless,
given Herman's disregard of uniformity of result, Herman would
likely place the line of preemption somewhere further away from the
collateral law midpoint than "outcome-determinative," yet not as far
as Hart's "nullification of the federal right" point.
D. An Alternative Approach Based on Felder v. Casey
Although Felder did not explicitly articulate a standard for handling the core of the converse-Erie problem-state collateral rules
that are less supportive of § 1983 plaintiffs than federal collateral law,
yet are not outcome-determinative-the Court's reasoning provides
the basis for an alternative approach to those suggested by Hart,
Neuborne, and Herman. This approach starts with the presumption
that the state collateral law should be applicable in state court § 1983
actions, absent some reason for preemption. 156 The threshold factor
in this approach is whether the state collateral law in question is more
or less supportive of the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983
154. Herman realizes this as well: "I have no easy answers, for these are not easy issues. In
fact, many of my conclusions render these choice of law decisions more difficult than they might
otherwise be." Herman, supra note 4, at 1063.

155. Consider Herman's conclusion that "states should be permitted to use their own neutral
procedures so long as those procedures are not so inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983
as to warrant judicial exercise of the supremacy clause, regardless of whether those procedures
are more or less generous to plaintiffs than federal procedure would have been," id. at 1094,
which is more a restatement of the problem being discussed than it is a tool for making decisions.
156. "No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition... that States may establish
the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own Courts. By the same token, however,

where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the 'federal right cannot be

defeated by the forms of local practice."' Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting
Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949)).
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than federal collateral law. If the state collateral law is more generous
to § 1983 plaintiffs, the state law should be applied. 157 Herman's reasoning in this area is persuasive: uniformity aside, there is no reason
not to allow states courts that are willing to make it easier for plaintiffs
to litigate their § 1983 claims to apply their own favorable collateral
laws. 158 This is a point on which Hart, Neuborne, and Herman would
likely agree, albeit for different reasons. 159
If, however, a state collateral law differs from the federal collateral law in a way that is less supportive of the compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983-that is, it makes it more difficult for
§ 1983 plaintiffs to recover-the next inquiry is whether the state collateral law alone frequently and predictably would cause a plaintiff to
lose in state court when that plaintiff would have been successful in
federal court. 160 If so, the law should be preempted because state
courts, who are prevented by the Supremacy Clause from directly defeating federal rights, should not be able to use collateral rules to indirectly defeat the same federal rights. 16' Herman's conclusion that
162
some disparity of result must be tolerated out of respect for neutral
state collateral rules misplaces the focus of the analysis on what the
state did or did not do rather than on the right of recovery guaranteed
under § 1983. Section 1983 was enacted because "neutral" state
courts were able to vindicate citizens' civil rights in theory but not in
157. The Felder Court had no occasion to reach this issue because the Wisconsin notice-ofclaim statute was clearly disadvantageous to § 1983 plaintiffs.

158. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1115-18, 1130-31. In fact, there is much to the argument
that states should be encouraged to provide a more favorable forum for § 1983 litigation than

that available in the federal courts. This is true both from the standpoint of federalism and the
compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983: states would take care of internal problems
internally, and the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983 would be carried out to their
fullest.
159. Hart and Herman would agree because the state interest in following its own collateral
law is being served. Neubome would also agree, but because individual rights are being protected. It should be noted, however, that the application of a state collateral law more favorable
to plaintiffs would wreak havoc on Neuborne's uniformity and familiarity principles. See supra
notes 105-127 and accompanying text.
160. Stated in terms of the continuum, does the state collateral rule deviate so far from the
federal collateral rule that it will cause the litigation to come out differently?
161. Underlying the Felder decision and the FELA decisions is a valid concern that if cases
turn out differently in different fora, it should be solely because of the merits of the cases, not

because of the intricacies of the forum. As such, it does not matter whether the different outcome is the secondary effect of an otherwise neutral state rule, or the actual purpose of the
collateral rule. If one accepts the argument that the federal court result is the "correct" result,

see supra notes 14, 62 and accompanying text, then there is no reason to allow a state collateral
rule to frequently and predictably reach a different result.
162. Herman would presumably preempt nonneutral state collateral rules that directly dis-

criminate against the § 1983 cause of action. See Herman, supra note 4, at 1114.
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practice. 163 Congress thus created a fair federal forum in which citizens could bring civil rights claims without fear of explicit or implicit
bias, and where the "correct" result thus could be reached. It must be
assumed, then, that the result reached in § 1983 litigation in federal
courts is the "correct" result. 164 For state courts to frequently and
predictably reach a different result because of a state collateral ruleeven an ostensibly neutral rule-harkens the days when vindication of
civil rights was available in state courts in theory but not in practice.
Just as this necessitated the creation of a federal forum in 1871, today
it necessitates the preemption of any state collateral law that frequently and predictably causes a different result from that which
would have been reached in federal § 1983 litigation.
Felder went even further, though, and suggested that inconsistency with the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983 that does
not reach the level of outcome-determination may also mandate preemption. 165 Three factors guided the Felder Court in its analysis: the
Wisconsin legislature's purpose in enacting the notice-of-claim provi167
sion, 166 the provision's facial discrimination against § 1983 plaintiffs,
and the provision's functioning as an improper exhaustion
requirement.' 68
The Felder Court found that the Wisconsin legislature's purpose
in enacting the notice-of-claim provision was to control the § 1983 liability of its actors. 169 This was evident, the Court concluded, because
the very design of the provision primarily benefitted governmental defendants by facilitating early investigation of claims, the preparation
of a stronger case, and early settlement. 70 Although Congress had
elected to expose state actors for liability for civil rights violations, the
Court found that the notice-of-claim provision was an attempt by the
Wisconsin legislature to override Congressional intent.' 71 However,
the Felder Court did not preempt the Wisconsin provision solely because it burdened a federal right of recovery, but instead because the
Wisconsin legislature's purpose was to burden the federal right in or163. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
164. See supra note 14.
165. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1988).
166. Id. at 142-45.
167. Id. at 145-46.
168. Id. at 146-50.
169. Id. at 142.
170. See id
171. See id. at 143. It is noteworthy that the Court inquired into actual, rather than stated,
purpose.
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der to reduce the liability of state and local governments. 172 The
Court hinted that had the additional burden placed on § 1983 plaintiffs bringing suit in Wisconsin courts been the peripheral result of a
legitimate procedural scheme, the burden may not have triggered preemption. 173 The standard being applied in Felder seems to be that if
the actual purpose of a state collateral law is to eviscerate the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983, then the law must be
preempted.
The Felder majority also relied on its conclusion that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim provision facially discriminated against § 1983
plaintiffs. The Wisconsin statute was only applicable to plaintiffs wishing to sue state governmental defendants, the very group that § 1983
was designed to protect. On its face, the Wisconsin provision treats
§ 1983 claims against state and local government officials differently
from other claims. Furthermore, the notice-of-claim provision, on its
face, discriminates against § 1983 plaintiffs by conferring a benefit on
§ 1983 defendants (i.e., early notice to aid in the preparation of a case
and, potentially, prompt settlement) and placing a burden on § 1983
plaintiffs (i.e., a relatively short period in which to begin the litigation
process, and the effort required to comply with the statute). This facial discrimination alone would have triggered preemption, even if the
174
Wisconsin legislature had a permissible motive in enacting the rule.
The standard that can be extracted from Felder in this regard is that if
a state collateral rule on its faces discriminates against § 1983 plaintiffs,175 it is impermissibly inconsistent with the policies of § 1983 and
176
must be preempted.
Lastly, the Felder Court based its preemption on the fact that,
when applied, the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute served as an exhaustion requirement that was inconsistent with the remedial and deterrence purposes of § 1983.177 Setting aside the fact that the
172. Id. at 144-45.
173. "This burdening of a federal right[ I is not the natural or permissible consequence of an
otherwise neutral, uniformly applicable rule." Id. at 144.
174. It is unlikely, however, that any statute that on its face specifically discriminates against
§ 1983 plaintiffs could have a permissible purpose.
175. A statute that on its face confers a benefit to § 1983 plaintiffs should be applied as usual.

See supra note 55-57 and accompanying text. Rather, only state rules that on their face adversely affect § 1983 plaintiffs should be preempted.
176. For analytical purposes, the facial discrimination inquiry will generally inform the pur-

pose inquiry. That is, if the statute on its face adversely affects § 1983 plaintiffs, then in most
cases an impermissible purpose will also be present.
177. Id. at 146-47. Because the Court envisioned the notice-of-claim statute as an exhaustion
requirement, and because the Court in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), had ruled
that § 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983
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Wisconsin provision failed the first two prongs of the inconsistency
analysis, Felder seems to indicate that even if a state has a legitimate
purpose for enacting a collateral rule, and even if that rule does not
facially discriminate against § 1983 plaintiffs, the rule could be preempted as inconsistent with the remedial and deterrence policies of
§ 1983.178 The Court does not explicitly articulate how it reached its
decision that notice-of-claim provision was inconsistent with the policies of § 1983.179 However, underlying its decision may have been a
balancing of interests in which the Court considered what the state
hoped to achieve from applying the collateral rule against the burden
that rule placed on the § 1983 right of recovery. This balancing was
easy-and perhaps even unnecessary 8 0-in regard to the Wisconsin
statute, which the Court concluded had an impermissible purpose and
therefore could not hope to achieve any permissible benefits. In other
cases, however, a balancing test will weigh the state interests against
the collateral rule's effect on the policies of § 1983 in making the decision whether to apply or preempt the state collateral rule. On the
state side, the factors to be considered are what legitimate ends the
provision will serve, and what effect preempting the state rule and
applying a federal rule will serve. 181 Against these state interests,
courts must weigh the effect the rule will have on the remedial and
deterrence policies of § 1983. For example, if a state collateral rule
exists only because it is the rule that the state courts are familiar with,
yet that rule will substantially hinder a § 1983 plaintiff, the rule should
be preempted. On the other hand, if the state has a legitimate purpose for enacting a rule, and the rule only tangentially and marginally
affects the § 1983 cause of action, it should be applied.
The Felder approach to the converse-Erie problem has some significant advantages over the other approaches advanced by Hart,
claim in federal court, it was easy for the Felder Court to find that an exhaustion rule was inconsistent with the policies of § 1983. One could even argue that Feldercould have been decided on
the basis that the Patsy prohibition against exhaustion of administrative remedies was part of the
substantive law of § 1983 and thus applicable in state court § 1983 litigation. This approach
would have avoided the converse-Erie problem entirely. Regardless, after Felder it seems clear
that the Patsy exhaustion rule controls in both federal and state court.
178. Of course, one could also read Felder more narrowly as holding that the effect of the
Wisconsin statute naturally flowed from its impermissible purpose and facial discrimination, rendering the "in effect" analysis dicta.
179. This is likely so because the exhaustion function of the provision had previously been
found to be inconsistent with the substantive law of § 1983.
180. If the provision fails the purpose analysis, then there is no need to go on to the balancing test because the benefits the state hopes to achieve are impermissible and the federal interest
will always weighs more.
181. The former consideration reflects the state's policy-making and dignitary interests, while
the latter administrative consideration reflects the state's housekeeping interests.
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Neuborne, and Herman. First, it is the only approach that truly takes
into consideration the federal and state interests. Unlike Neuborne,
the Felder approach considers that the states do indeed have a legitimate interest in enacting and pursuing their own collateral laws. But
unlike Hart and Herman, it also takes into account the weighty federal interest in ensuring that the remedial and deterrence policies of
§ 1983 are carried out without being negated-directly or indirectlyby state collateral rules. Although the ultimate decision to apply or
preempt will serve either the state or federal interest more than the
other, the process through which the decision was made fully considers all the interests involved.
Second, the Felder approach's systematic analysis of the converseErie problem is both easy to administer and flexible. Hart's plaintiff's
choice approach and Neuborne's individual rights approach are both
undeniably easy to administer, but they are so only because they draw
extreme, all-or-nothing lines. Conversely, Herman sacrifices ease of
administration with the flexibility of the "inherently hostile" standard,
with judges given so little guidance that the test becomes difficult to
administer.'8s The Felder approach, on the other hand, provides both
guidance and flexibility. It systematically removes the state collateral
rules that should per se be applied' 83 or preempted' 84 to focus on the
state collateral rules that are less generous to the policies of § 1983
than the federal collateral rules yet do not deviate so far as to be outcome-determinative. It then enables the court to balance the relevant
interests involved to determine which of these rules necessitate
preemption.
The Felder approach puts the preemption line on the converseErie continuum somewhere between the federal collateral law midpoint and the point of outcome-determination, with the precise location of the line dependent on a balance of the state and federal
interests involved. It allows a state to employ collateral rules that deviate so long as it has a legitimate reason for doing so and the state's
reason is not outweighed by the effect the rule will have on the policies of § 1983.

182. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
183. This includes any state rule that is more generous to the policies of § 1983 than federal
collateral law.
184. This includes all state collateral rules that are outcome-determinative on the side of
frequently and predictably causing the § 1983 plaintiff to lose in state court when she would have
won in federal court.
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IV.

APPLYING THE CONVERSE-ERIE APPROACHES TO
REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS

While it is worthwhile to discuss the various approaches to the
converse-Erie problem in the abstract, it is also important to analyze
how these approaches would function in the courtroom. This Part discusses how each of the approaches discussed in Part III would be applied to a recent Colorado Supreme Court case which raised the
converse-Erie question in the § 1983 context. 185

A.

Boulder Valley School District v. Price

In Boulder Valley School District R-2 v. Price, 8 6 the Colorado
Supreme Court grappled with Colorado's standard of proof requirement for punitive damages in § 1983 litigation. The plaintiff in Boulder Valley, Gary Price, was a tenured teacher in the defendant school
district, who, after eight years of performing satisfactorily as a teacher,
encountered personal problems that affected his work. 187 Price eventually had a conference with his principal, during which the two disof
cussed the requirements of Price's job and the possibility 188
disciplinary action if Price's work performance did not improve.
The principal summarized the conference in a memo to Price, to
which Price responded with a letter in which he expressed thoughts
about leaving teaching. 189 A week later, the principal entered Price's
classroom on two occasions, placed a typewritten letter of resignation
on Price's desk, discussed with Price the possibility of Price's resignation, and told Price that if he did not sign the letter, there would be a
disciplinary hearing. 90 Price ultimately signed the letter of resignation, and the defendant district accepted it.' 9'
Price subsequently brought a § 1983 action against the principal
and the school district, alleging that he had been constructively dis92
charged without a hearing in violation of his due process rights.'
185. For purposes of this Note, I assume that the Colorado statute at issue does not conflict
with the substantive law of § 1983, and is thus not automatically preempted. Tis is a point as to
which the Boulder Valley majority and the dissenting Justice Lohr differ. At least one commentator has concluded that Boulder Valley was wrongly decided because there is a direct conflict
between the Colorado statute and the substantive law of § 1983. See NAHMOD, supra note 25, at
54.
186. 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991).
187. Id. at 1087.
188. See id.

189.
190.
191.
192.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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The case was tried before a jury, which was instructed that it could
award punitive damages against the principal if it found "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the principal had acted in reckless disregard of
Price's rights. 193 The jury returned verdicts against the school district
in the amount of $60,000, and against the principal but without any
monetary damages.' 94 No punitive damages were awarded. 195 The
trial court then entered a judgement notwithstanding the verdict
("JNOV") for the district and the principal. 196 The appeals court reversed the trial court's JNOV, and ordered a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages, with a "preponderance of the evidence" standard
to be used at the new trial' 97
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on the
JNOV issue, but reversed as to the standard of proof for punitive
damages. 98 The court first held that Smith v. Wade, 199 a Supreme
Court § 1983 punitive damages case, was not controlling. 2°° It concluded that Smith v. Wade merely stood for the proposition that a
finding of reckless disregard merited the award of punitive damages in
a § 1983 action. Since Smith did not address the burden of proof required, it did not foreclose the possibility that states could require a
higher standard of proof for a finding of reckless disregard than the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard that governs federal civil
litigation. 20
Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court turned to § 1988's
three-step process for determining whether Colorado state law should
be used to fill the deficiency in the federal law. 20 2 The Court found no
federal statute or federal common law governing the burden of proof
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Price v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., 782 P.2d 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
See Boulder Valley, 805 P.2d at 1094.

199. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
200. See Boulder Valley, 805 P.2d at 1089.

201. See id.
202. This process was outlined in Wilson v. Garciaand was quoted by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Boulder Valley, id. at 1089:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws are suitable
to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." [42 U.S. § 1988] If no
suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application
of state "common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the
forum state. Id. A third step assets the predominance of the federal interest: courts are
to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Id.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48
(1984)).
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for punitive damages, 20 3 so it then looked at its state law and found a
Colorado statute 2° mandating that the burden of proof for a finding
of punitive damages in civil actions is "beyond a reasonable doubt." 20 5
The Court then reasoned that the statute was not inconsistent with the
deterrence purpose of § 1983 because state actors run the risk of facing a § 1983 action in federal court and always have the removal option at their disposal, so they act the with federal "preponderance of
the evidence" standard in mind regardless of whether a state standard
of proof is higher or lower. 20 6 Thus, the court concluded that a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof in the state court would
not lower the deterrent effect of § 1983, and therefore was not inconsistent with the policies of § 1983.207 The majority opinion did not cite
Felder v. Casey, presumably because it saw the issue not as one of
preemption but rather as one of deficiency where the application of
§ 1988 was necessary. 208
A dissent by Justice Lohr argued that the a "preponderance of
the evidence" standard should be used in all state court § 1983 determinations of punitive damages because of the need for uniformity
among the states, and because the standard of proof for punitive damages is embodied in federal common law.209 Alternatively, Justice
Lohr argued that even if the federal law is deficient as to the standard

203. See Boulder Valley, 805 P.2d at 1089-90. At least one commentator has argued that

Smith v. Wade established the burden of proof for punitive damages as preponderance of the
evidence. See NAHmOD, supra note 25, at 54.
204. See CoLO.REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987).
205. See Boulder Valley, 805 P.2d at 1090-91.
206. See id. at 1091.
207. See id.
208. The analysis is the same whether the issue is preemption or deficiency. See STEINOLASS,
supra note 15, § 10.5 at 10-14 to 10-16. Preemption under the Supremacy Clause is required

when state law-whether substantive or collateral-conflicts with the substantive law of § 1983
or is inconsistent with the purposes or policies of § 1983. When federal substantive law is deficient, a § 1988 analysis ultimately rests on whether the state gap-filling law is consistent with the
purposes of § 1983. Thus, in either case, inconsistency with the purposes of § 1983 is the focus of
the analysis.
Since § 1988 is directed at filling gaps in federal law, it would seem more appropriate to see
the issue here as preemption rather than § 1988 gap-filling.
209. See Boulder Valley, 805 P.2d at 1094-96 (Lohr, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Lohr makes a compelling argument that a uniform rule is necessary in the punitive
damages context. He reasons that because some states do not generally allow punitive damages,
but must allow punitive damages under § 1983, a uniform rule must be established for use in
those states. See id. at 1095. That uniform "preponderance of the evidence" standard should
then be used by all state courts in § 1983 actions. See id. at 1099.
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of proof for punitive damages, a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is incompatible with the purposes and policies of § 1983.210
B. Boulder Valley in Light of the Proposed Approaches
Boulder Valley puts the converse-Erie issue squarely on the table.
On one hand, Colorado's stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof for punitive damages undeniably makes it more difficult
for a § 1983 plaintiff to recover punitive damages than it would be if
he had brought the case in federal court, where a preponderance of
the evidence standard governs. At the same time, Colorado has an
interest in applying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that its
legislature has decided should govern all punitive damages claims
brought in Colorado courts. Boulder Valley thus provides a vehicle
for considering how well each of the approaches to the converse-Erie
problem would function in addressing an actual fact pattern. 21 ' In addition to the various factors previously discussed, this analysis also
considers the ease a state court judge would have in applying the sug-

2 12
gested test, both at a practical and at a philosophical level.

1. The Plaintiff's Choice Approach
Hart would have an easy time with the § 1983 converse-Erie issue
that arises in Boulder Valley. His two preconditions are clearly met:
Price could have elected to bring his § 1983 claim in a fair, federal
forum and the Colorado statute does not nullify the § 1983 right to
recovery, but merely makes it more difficult to recover punitive damages. Therefore, Hart would look to the general rule that "federal law
takes state courts as it finds them," and apply the heightened standard
210. See id. at 1096-98. Justice Lohr argues that the purpose of the Colorado statute was to
limit purely punitive damage awards in civil cases, and this purpose is in direct conflict with
§ 1983's deterrence policy. See id. at 1097-98.
211. The Colorado punitive damages rule poses a significantly more difficult converse-Erie
problem than the Wisconsin notice-of-claim provision. While the notice-of-claim provision was
outcome-determinative and could keep plaintiffs out of court without an opportunity to recover
at all, the Colorado rule only affects the ability of § 1983 plaintiffs to recover punitive damages;
compensatory damages are not affected. Moreover, the Wisconsin rule on its face discriminated
against § 1983 plaintiffs by only being applicable in suits against state and local government
officials. The Colorado rule, on the other hand, is applicable to all civil plaintiffs.
212. Analysis at the "practical level" means the ease or difficulty a state court judge would
have in making a decision based on the various approaches. Analysis at the "philosophical
level" means how accepting a state court judge would be in reaching the decision suggested by
the approaches. while one could argue that how receptive a judge is to a particular decision is
not relevant, it is relevant in that a test that is philosophically disdained by a judge is not likely to
be administered fairly or accurately.
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of proof. The negative ramifications for Price21 3 would not matter to
Hart, who would reason that because Price chose to litigate his § 1983
claim in the Colorado courts, there must be some advantage Price
hoped to derive from bringing his claim there rather than federal
court. According to Hart, it therefore would defy both common sense
and the federal system to allow Price to have the advantages of both
fora.
From the perspective of the state court judge, it would not be
difficult, either practically or philosophically, to apply the plaintiff's
choice approach to the Boulder Valley fact pattern. At the practical
level, the decision would be easy because Hart's lines are unmistakably clear: given that the federal courts are always there for § 1983
plaintiffs, the state rule applies unless it nullifies the right of recovery
completely. At the philosophical level, it seems intuitive that a state
court judge would prefer to apply a rule that expresses the will of the
people of the state rather than reaching the countermajoritarian conclusion that the state rule must be preempted in favor of the policies
of § 1983.214
Of course, this decision would-and the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision likely does-disserve the policies of § 1983. If punitive damages have a deterrent effect not only because of their applicability in a specific situation but also because they exist generally,21 5
denying Price punitive damages because he failed to meet the beyond
the reasonable doubt standard would erode, at least to some degree,
the deterrent effects of § 1983.216
2. The Individual Rights Approach
Boulder Valley would be as easy a case for Neuborne as it would
be for Hart, but Neuborne would reach the opposite result. Even assuming that the Colorado statute would not be likely to inhibit
§ 1983's remedial function, a strong argument can be made that the
Colorado statute "would be likely to permit behavior which the § 1983
213. The result under the plaintiff's choice approach would be the same as that reached by
the Colorado Supreme Court: the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard would apply, the jury's
finding that Price did not meet that standard would stand, and Price would not recover punitive
damages.
214. This is not an unimportant consideration, especially when one considers that state court
judges are typically elected, and thus must answer to the voters on a periodic basis.
215. See infra note 218.
216. Of course, it may not have been the higher standard of proof that kept the jury from
awarding punitive damages. For instance, the jury may not have found that the Price proved
that the principal acted in reckless disregard of his due process rights even if the standard of
proof was preponderance of the evidence.
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cause of action was designed to deter" 217 because plaintiffs would
have more difficulty meeting the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement for punitive damages and would consequently be awarded
punitive damages in fewer cases. 21 8 Under Neuborne's test, the more
hospitable "preponderance of the evidence" standard of the federal
generative jurisdiction would then be applicable in § 1983 litigation in
Colorado courts. For Price, this would mean another opportunity to
prove to a jury that punitive damages are warranted under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
While this might lead to a result more favorable to the protection
of individual rights, it would certainly serve Neuborne's other goals of
providing a uniform and familiar set of collateral rules to govern all
§ 1983 litigation.219 According to Neuborne, this would also serve
federalism interests because Colorado § 1983 plaintiffs would have no
reason based on collateral law not to "stay at home" to litigate their
civil rights claims. However, the state's dignitary interest in applying
the collateral scheme enacted by its legislature would be disserved by
such a result, as would the state interest in expedient litigation
through familiar collateral rules. 220
217. Neuborne, supra note 4, at 780.
218. The Colorado Supreme Court argued that deterrence was not affected by the Colorado
statute because state actors would still have to base their conduct on the federal standard of
proof since plaintiffs always have the ability to bring a § 1983 action in federal court. See supra
text accompanying notes 202-208. While the Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning is sound in
the abstract, one could call into question whether it is sound in the real world. First, it is fanciful
to assume that state actor X's decision whether to violate citizen Y's civil rights would turn on
the obscure fact that even though Colorado law requires "beyond a reasonable doubt" proof of
the reckless disregard that can trigger the imposition of punitive damages, X must take into
consideration that he could face charges in federal court, where the standard of proof for the
reckless disregard that could trigger punitive damages is merely "preponderance of the evidence." It seems implausible that, except for the rare, preplanned "what can we get away with
and how" kind of civil rights violation, the different standards of proof would affect the actions
of potential § 1983 defendants.
Second, deterrence arguably flows not from a lesson learned about a particular sort of conduct in a particular situation governed by particular legal rules, but rather from the publicity
surrounding any award of punitive damages, no matter what the infraction. One can argue that
deterrence comes about because state actors know punitive damages are possible if they act
inappropriately, above and beyond any consideration of the applicable legal rules. If this is true,
it means that more awards of punitive damages mean more deterrence. It would therefore follow that because the Colorado statute makes punitive damages less frequent because of the
higher standard of proof, the Colorado statute would be likely to permit behavior which § 1983
was designed to deter.
219. Note that the concern raised about Neubome's test in Part III.B does not arise here
because the state collateral law is less generous than federal collateral law.
220. This is not such a significant argument in this case because the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard is not a foreign concept to Colorado judges. And because all the claims
brought by Price arose under § 1983, the problem with different standards of proof applying to
different claims in the same case does not materialize in the Boulder Valley fact pattern.
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As far as the practical effects of the individual rights approach, a
state court judge would likely have mixed feelings about applying
Neuborne's individual right's approach. Neuborne's approach would
be relatively easy for judges to apply: the only inquiry is whether the
application of the state collateral law is likely to permit the violation
of civil rights or likely to inhibit recovery under § 1983. However, at
the philosophical level, state court judges familiar with state collateral
rules and partial to those rules because they reflect the will of the
people might resist making the countermajoritarian decisions that the
individual rights approach would often require. 221 Moreover, state
court judges would likely resist the inflexibility of the individual rights
approach because it takes discretion entirely out of their hands.
3.

The Balancing-of-Interests Approach

Herman would also likely affirm the trial court's finding that Colorado's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable in the
§ 1983 context, although her conclusion would not be as straightforward as that of Hart. The determinative factor for Herman is whether
the Colorado rule is "inherently hostile" to the § 1983 cause of action.22 2 Herman would likely consider first that the Colorado provi-

sion is applicable to all punitive damages claims, not just those arising
under § 1983, and is therefore neutral. Second, she would likely reason that because § 1983 plaintiffs would not be hindered in attempting
to recover compensatory damages, and they would merely face a more
difficult task in recovering punitive damages, the Colorado statute is
not inherently hostile to the compensation and deterrence policies of
221. This may not be as evident in a case like Boulder Valley where the judge-and probably
the public at large-could empathize with the plaintiff. But when the plaintiff is seen as "less
deserving"-for example a plaintiff who alleges he was beaten by police officers in the course of
an arrest, and is later convicted on the charge for which he was arrested-it may be difficult for a
popularly elected judge to preempt a state rule in order to make it easier for the plaintiff to
recover large punitive damages awards.
222. Herman would ostensibly be performing a balancing test to reach this decision,
although I have argued previously that the "balancing-of-interest approach" does not actually
balance but instead bases its outcome on whether the state collateral rule in question is inherently hostile to § 1983. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. This holds true when
Herman's approach is applied to the Boulder Valley fact pattern. On one side of her balancing
test, Herman would consider the federal interest in preventing state courts from defeating the
rights created by § 1983. In regard to the Colorado statute, the federal interest would have no
weight because the statute does not threaten to defeat the § 1983 right of recovery-that is, it is
not inherently hostile to § 1983-but instead merely makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive damages. On the state side, Herman would weigh the state interest in controlling
punitive damages in all civil litigation, as well as the intangible but arguably noteworthy dignitary interest in promulgating and applying its own procedural rules. Clearly the state interest
"outweighs" the federal interest, because there is no federal interest to weigh.
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§ 1983.223 Under Herman's balancing-of-interests approach, then, the
Colorado statute would likely be applied, with the same result obtaining that was reached in Boulder Valley.
Although this result would not likely be philosophically unpalatable for state court judges to swallow, the balancing-of-interests approach would be more difficult to apply than either Hart or
Neuborne's approaches. While it is plausible that the inherently hostile analysis would turn out the way suggested above, it is not improbable that a judge could find the higher punitive damages standard of
proof inherently hostile to the policies of § 1983 because it disproportionately affects plaintiffs-including § 1983 plaintiffs-as compared
to defendants. But this play in the application of the inherently hostile standard has a concomitant value for state court judges: it leaves
some amount of discretion in their hands.
4. The Felder v. Casey Approach
The threshold issue under the Felder approach is whether the
state collateral law is more or less generous than the federal collateral
rules to § 1983 plaintiffs. Because the Colorado statute makes it more
difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive damages and is thus less generous than federal collateral law, the next point of analysis is whether
the Colorado law will frequently and predictably provide for different
outcomes than would have been reached in federal court § 1983 litigation. At a general level, the Colorado statute has no effect on whether
§ 1983 plaintiffs are able to prevail on their § 1983 claims because it
only goes to the issue of punitive damages. Since plaintiffs are not
hindered either in proving their claim or in recovering compensatory
damages, the Colorado statute would likely survive the outcome-de224
terminative analysis.
Next, the analysis turns to whether the provision serves an impermissible purpose, facially discriminates against the § 1983 cause of action, or cannot be justified in comparing the purpose it serves against
223. However, one could also envision Herman preempting the higher standard of proof
because it disproportionately affects plaintiffs outside the context of a specific case, and is thus
"inherently hostile." See Herman, supra note 4, at 1133. This inability to predict how a court
would rule on the Colorado punitive damages standard using the balancing-of-interests approaches highlights the vagueness and subjectivety of the "inherently hostile" standard. See
supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
224. This conclusion is dependent, however, on the level of generality at which the analysis is
done. For instance, if one looks at whether the awarding of punitive damages will frequently and
predictably be different because of the Colorado statute, the result of the outcome-determinative
analysis might be different.
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the burden it places on the policies of § 1983.225 The beyond a reason-

able doubt standard of proof for punitive damages would likely fail
both the impermissible purpose and balancing portions of this analysis, and thus would necessitate preemption under the Felder approach.
One could reasonably conclude that regardless of what the Colorado legislature sets forth as the purpose of the higher standard of
proof for punitive damages, the actual purpose was to limit the frequency of punitive damage awards in civil litigation. 226 Such a purpose directly conflicts with the remedial and deterrence policies of
§ 1983, which the Supreme Court has said should be "accorded 'a
sweep as broad as its language.'

'' 22 7

It should thus be preempted

when § 1983 litigation is heard in Colorado courts.
The Colorado provision also fails the Felder approach's balancing
test. As stated above, the benefit Colorado gains from the provision is
fewer awards of punitive damages. 228 Against this, one must consider
that the higher standard of proof would significantly eviscerate the
deterrent effect of § 1983.229 Moreover, the effects of preempting the
state rule and applying the federal standard would be minimal since
Colorado judges are already familiar with applying the preponderance
of the evidence standard, and a jury would not be unduly confused by
conflicting instructions. 230 When one considers all these factors, it is
quite clear that under the Felder approach the Colorado statute
should be preempted when § 1983 claims are heard in its state courts.
While Colorado may not be particularly pleased with this result,
it could not be said that the state interests were not considered when
225. The Colorado provision does not facially discriminate against the § 1983 cause of action
because it applies to all punitive damages claims irrespective of how they arise. Nor does it have
a disproportionate effect on § 1983 plaintiffs; it effects all civil plaintiffs equally.
226. "A major legislative purpose underlying section 13-21-102 as it existed at the time of the
trial was to avoid purely punitive civil damages awards." Boulder Valley School Dist. v. Price,
805 P.2d 1085, 1097 (Colo. 1991) (Lohr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
801 (1966)). This argument was made by Justice Lohr in his dissent. See Boulder Valley, 805
P.2d at 1097 (Lohr, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. For purposes of the balancing analysis, we must assume that these benefits are legitimate. In actuality, the balancing test would not be necessary here since the analysis would end
when we ascertain that the state legislature's actual purposes for enacting the statute conflict
with the policies of § 1983.
229. See supra note 218.
230. This is obviously true in this case, where only § 1983 claims are at stake. But even if
there were state punitive damages claims that would be subject to the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, the effect of varying standards would be minimal. A jury would be no more
confused by different standards of proof between the federal and Colorado punitive damages
claims than it would be if only a Colorado claim was at issue and the jury had to apply a preponderance standard in regard to compensatory damages and a beyond a reasonable doubt standard
for punitives.
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applying the Felder approach. The same, of course, cannot be said of
Neuborne's individual rights approach, which would reach the same
result but without considering the state interests at all. The Felder
approach also pays the respect due the remedial and deterrence policies of § 1983, which cannot be said of either Hart or Herman's approaches. In other words, the Felder approach fairly and
systematically considers all the interests involved and reaches an appropriate result.
Furthermore, state court judges would not be troubled by the Felder approach, even it reaches a countermajoritarian result. The Felder
approach is not difficult to apply, yet it leaves some discretion in the
hands of the state judges. And because it does take the state interests
into consideration, judges would be less likely to be hostile to the
counter-majoritarian result than they would have had the same result
been reached under Neuborne's approach.
CONCLUSION

If the trend toward increased state court litigation of § 1983
claims continues, the converse-Erie problem likely will arise more
often and pose difficult questions for judges, plaintiffs, and defendants
alike. The Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey began the process of
formulating the approach to be taken in analyzing converse-Erie
problems, but it did not have occasion to reach the issue of how to
handle state collateral laws that are less generous to § 1983 plaintiffs
but are not outcome-determinative.
This Note has analyzed in some detail four potential approaches
for solving the converse-Erie questions. Although each of the approaches have relative strengths and weaknesses, the approaches suggested by Hart, Neuborne, and Herman are significantly
disadvantaged by their one-sidedness. Both Hart's plaintiff's choice
approach and Herman's balancing-of-interest approach tend to overvalue state interests at the expense of the policies of § 1983.
Neuborne's individual rights approach, on the other hand, neglects the
state interests while focusing solely on the § 1983 right of recovery.
The approach based on Felder v. Casey, on the other hand, respects both the federal and state interests in formulating a systematic
approach to solving the converse-Erie problem. Although the conclusion it reaches with regard to a particular state collateral rule will inevitably displease either the states or § 1983 plaintiffs, the Felder
approach takes a middle ground in analyzing the converse-Erie prob-
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lem. In doing so, it provides a solution with which the federal and
state interests could both abide.

